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Abstract 
This paper gives an overview of the channels by which the EU budget is directly or indirectly affected 
by the change in the external trade relations of the EU. In addition it discusses what role the EU budget 
can play, despite its limited size and scope, in addressing some other key challenges presented by 
globalisation and liberalised trade flows. The paper begins with a detailed theoretical explanation of the 
ways in which the EU budget is directly or indirectly affected by its revenues, structure and objectives. It 
then reviews how the EU budget has been affected by the changing challenges of trade liberalisation and 
expansion, in particular due to decisions at the WTO negotiations. This leads to an analysis of the 
possible impacts on the EU budget from the current DDA negotiations, and a discussion of how 
international economic and trade developments may challenge the EU and what role the budget can play 
in assisting the adaptation of Europe’s economy to these challenges. 
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Executive Summary 
This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between the EU budget and the process of 
trade liberalisation, in particular the effects of forthcoming agreements under the WTO Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). The document is divided into three main parts: historical 
influences on the EU budget, the likely direct implications of a successful Doha round, and 
finally how sensitive the budget might be to future developments, including how it will address 
the challenges facing the European Union. 
The budget is not designed to address trade issues  
Historically, the budget was not created to be a proactive tool in the international trade arena. 
The linkages to trade were restricted to the raising of revenue for the budget or exporting excess 
production in the agricultural sector via subsidies. This is not surprising, as budget expenditures 
were mainly limited to agricultural policy at first and only later to the structural funds. The first 
main impact on the EU budget has been from the integration of agricultural trade into 
multilateral trade negotiations following the Uruguay round. Due to the strong reliance of EU 
agricultural policy on a system of high tariffs and export subsidies, such decisions have had a 
profound effect on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), changing the nature of the policy 
and its objectives. 
The EU budget is affected mainly by decisions on agricultural trade 
Agriculture has dominated trade negotiations ever since. For the EU it is an important domestic 
policy and for developing countries an important development area. So agriculture is still the 
key area in which the WTO process has a direct effect on the EU budget. In other areas the 
effects on the EU budget are almost non-existent or indirect. Thus the implications of the Doha 
round for the budget will mainly concern its effects on the CAP.  
Since the 1992 reforms, the EU has considerably reduced the level of export refunds, from 
approximately ECU 10,000 million in the early 1990s to €3,500 million in 2003. In the event of 
a successful DDA agreement, it is likely that export subsidies for the EU-25 will be 
progressively eliminated producing a cost saving of €4,000 million, which can have some 
implications for member states’ net balances. However, no other significant impacts are to be 
expected on the budget.  
The trade implications of a possible DDA agreement for agricultural markets are considerable. 
A fall in tariff barriers can cause important effects for some commodity markets. Major tariff 
reductions will negatively affect most sectors, in particular the meat and vegetables sectors. The 
wider opening of other markets partly counterbalances those effects, but overall trade balances 
will deteriorate. It is important to note that the decoupling of agricultural direct payments allows 
for an easier adjustment of the sector to changes. Overall, however, the economic benefits for 
the EU of increased trade liberalisation are estimated to largely exceed the losses sustained in 
the agricultural sector.  ii | KERNOHAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & SCHNEIDER 
 
The actual effect of the budgetary savings will depend on how these finances will be dealt with. 
These will either be deducted from the budget altogether or redistributed to compensate farmers 
or to support rural development expenditure. This is a political decision that will have to be 
taken once the shape of any agreement has emerged more clearly. 
Abolishing export refunds also has implications. Export subsidies exist due to the level of 
internal price support. Not subsidising exports requires internal prices to be reduced or excess 
production to be stored or destroyed. The second option is clearly not politically viable. The 
mid-term review and the proposed reforms of the sugar regime are conceived to prepare the 
EU’s agricultural sector for those tariff changes.  
The implications of the DDA for the EU budget are small … 
It is estimated that the revenues from the Common Customs Tariff will fall by approximately 
€1,000 million, which is 1% of the EU budget at present, shifting the resource to GNI 
contributions of the member states. These impacts are fairly limited. Tariffs do not have an 
effect on the official net balances, as these are not taken into account for the purposes of net 
balance calculations. 
Export subsidies are expected to be eliminated during the DDA, producing a cost saving of 
€4,000 million, which if not spent in other areas, can have some implications on the member 
states net balances, especially for those who have large subsidised exports. 
… but these small changes reveal the weaknesses of the EU budget structure… 
The savings, if not re-channelled into other expenditure areas in agriculture, will have 
implications on the net balances of the member states. It would damage the net balance of those 
countries that benefit from export subsidies but do not register savings in their contributions to 
the EU budget of a similar level. Big exporters, especially those with low contributions are 
worse off. Hungary and the Netherlands will see their net balances deteriorate by 0.06% of GNI 
and Denmark by 0.08 %. It is interesting to observe that a savings in the budget for the CAP can 
have negative implications for some of the member states that are calling for a reduction in 
budget expenditures to reduce their net contributions. 
Interestingly, a savings in export subsidies diminishes the net balance of the UK, thereby 
increasing the burden of the rebate on other member states. The analysis adds weight to the 
controversy surrounding the UK rebate, which certainly appears to be disproportionate. The ad-
hoc cuts for the main contributors to the budget to their share of the UK rebate ensure that the 
increased burden of the UK rebate falls on the poorer member states. The rebate is expected to 
be in excess of €7,300 million by 2013, as also estimated by the Commission’s Own Resources 
Report of 2004, and increases to over €7,500 million with the savings of the CAP export 
subsidies. 
… and its inability to respond to real needs effectively 
While the direct impacts of a multilateral trade agreement on the EU budget are limited, it is 
important to consider the role of the EU budget for the future, given the EU’s increasing 
domestic and international challenges. While the title invites us to analyse the ‘likely impacts of 
the EU budget on the WTO negotiations’, a clearer concern is that the EU budget appears to be 
unlikely to respond to the wider challenges of international trade developments in addition to 
those of an ageing population and enlargement.   
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The EU budget needs a radical re-thinking 
The EU has to face the challenges and opportunities offered by the trade liberalisation process. 
To be able to do so successfully, as well as having the capacity to influence the rules developed 
at the WTO level, the EU has to maintain – if not improve – its trading position. This can only 
be achieved if the European economy is strong. Thus, this paper calls for a deep revision of the 
budget and a speeding up of its restructuring in line with the Lisbon strategy to develop 
Europe’s competitiveness. Even the polices aimed at cohesion have to be improved, by better 
targeting of investment in the domestic growth potential of the poorer EU regions. This requires 
a more-integrated planning framework. The paper also calls for an improvement in the support 
for human capital investments from the EU budget. 
The future of the EU economic strength and welfare depends on its competitiveness. The EU 
budget today is a partial ‘relic’ based on outdated objectives of a different kind of EU. Now that 
the EU has new member countries with much lower GDPs per capita, an ageing population and 
a declining international competitiveness, the present budget is losing touch with reality. The 
Financial Perspectives for the period 2007-13, while acknowledging the challenges ahead, do 
not present a sufficiently changed agenda.  
The lack of perspective in the budget is partially caused by a preoccupation with the net 
balances of the member states. They are the outcome of difficult compromises that limit policy 
reform options drastically. This is reflected in the inability of the member states to accept the 
profound changes that enlargement implies, leading to the anomalous and contradictory disputes 
on net balances and the future budget, wherein countries simultaneously call for a reduction in 
their budget expenditures, but also defend their benefits derived from it. The EU should try to 
find a system that permits the elimination of the ‘net balance influence’ on important strategic 
decisions. 
The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the citizens of founding members of the EU is a 
signal that many citizens feel alienated from the developments in the EU, and partially mistrust 
the present political and institutional structures. Policy-makers have to send a signal that the EU 
is capable of taking the necessary steps to address the challenges ahead. Taking courageous 
political step to reform the EU resources and expenditure structures of the EU budget could be a 
good place to begin. 
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1. Introduction 
Trade and financial flows have increased radically during the last 50 years due to technological 
changes in transport and communications. With the expansion of these flows, the capacity of 
policy-makers to influence the domestic economy has changed. Policy-makers cannot intervene 
without considering important economic implications linked to the international trade position 
and the situation on international financial markets. Furthermore, policy-makers are increasingly 
‘forced’ to adapt domestic policies that are influenced by international markets rather than 
formulate policies based on domestic conditions.  
The EU’s case is a particular one, because it behaves in international trade relations as a large 
‘country’, while on the other hand it is composed of 25 sovereign countries, most of which are 
small open economies that are easily affected by changes in trade and international financial 
flows. Furthermore, while it is widely recognised that trade liberalisation is globally welfare-
enhancing, the distribution of the benefits as well as the costs are not evenly balanced. Thus 
changes in trade policy, even if considered neutral or positive at the EU level, can have 
distributional effects between member states and regions that are more difficult to accept.  
It is thus not surprising that policy-makers in the EU turn to Community instruments and to the 
budget to find mechanisms that can address the asymmetric impacts of external trade relations. 
The origins of the EU budget’s main expenditure areas were in fact created as a response to 
concerns over the distributional effects of the single market and can thus be considered by some 
as a legitimate tool for addressing any negative effects that originate from external trade.  
The revenue and expenditure of the EU budget have also been directly affected by changes in 
the trade relationships of the EU. In the case of expenditure, this is mainly true for agricultural 
policy, where the structure of EU subsidies has undergone radical change to conform to WTO 
trade agreements, affecting the nature of domestic subsidies. For revenues, the effects come 
from changes in the common customs tariff limitations imposed by international agreements. 
While the implications of trade liberalisation on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have 
been largely discussed in the literature, there has been little analysis of the potential links 
between other EU budget lines and trade. Only recently has attention turned to other areas and 
their potential role in improving the EU’s external competitiveness. 
This paper aims to give an overview of the channels by which the EU budget is directly or 
indirectly affected by the change in the external trade relations of the EU. In addition the study 
will also discuss what role the EU budget can play, despite its limited size and scope, in 
addressing some other key challenges presented by globalisation and liberalised trade flows. 
This may be of particular importance to the European Parliament, since its role in determining 
the shape and objectives of the EU budget is bound to expand in the future should the EU 
Constitution or similar reforms be adopted.    
Following this introductory section, section 2 presents a detailed theoretical explanation of the 
ways in which the EU budget is directly or indirectly affected by its revenues, structure and 
objectives. Section 3 reviews how the EU budget has been affected by the changing challenges 2 | KERNOHAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & SCHNEIDER 
 
of trade liberalisation and expansion, in particular due to decisions at the WTO negotiations. 
The fourth section analyses the possible impacts on the EU budget from the current DDA 
negotiations, and section 5 discusses how international economic and trade developments may 
challenge the EU and what role the budget can play in assisting the adaptation of Europe’s 
economy to these challenges. Section 6 presents a short summary and conclusions. 
2.  The EU budget and the WTO process – Theory 
The EU budget has a relatively simple structure. On the resources side, it depends largely on 
member states’ contributions based on their GNI (gross national income) and VAT (value-added 
tax) receipts. In addition, the so-called traditional own resources (TOR) cover 10-20% of the 
budget requirements. These are composed of 80% of the common customs tariff (CCT) 
revenues and some agricultural levies. On the expenditure side, the budget is at present divided 
into seven budgetary headings: Agriculture, Structural Operations, Internal Policies, External 
Action, Administration, Reserves and Pre-accession Aid.  
However, the budget is dominated by two of those headings, Agriculture, which takes over just 
under 50% of the budget and the structural funds, which are around 35% of the EU budget. The 
WTO negotiations have an important influence on the Agricultural budget, which is the only 
heading directly affected by the WTO negotiations.  
With the exception of the common customs tariffs, which provide a degree of protection to the 
internal market from import competition, the budget was not designed for handling directly 
international trade liberalisation. In fact, the budget is not designed to have any links with trade 
developments. The origin of the budget has its roots in internal trade ‘imbalances’. The CAP is 
said (amongst other reasons) to have originated by the expected stronger gains of the single 
market for industrial goods, thus benefiting countries like Germany more than the then more 
rural France (see e.g. Nugent, 1999; House of Commons, 2005). Even the agricultural export 
subsidies were not conceived as a trade tool, but as a means to allow the CAP to function with 
prices above the world market. The structural and cohesion funds were also designed for 
correcting internal regional disparities – also an inward-looking exercise.  
The reason for this absence of a budgetary side to trade is simply because EU competitiveness 
on the world stage only started to be a major concern since the early 1990s. Prior to that, the EU 
was more concerned with the process of opening and regulating the internal market, which was 
expected to generate substantial economic benefits. The rise of the Asian countries, and 
especially China and India as world competitors for high-value, high-tech consumer goods, has 
presented an unprecedented challenge in areas where rich developed countries have had the 
undisputed supremacy for most of the 20
th century. 
Thus, until the end of the 20
th century, the only relationship between the budget and trade and in 
general international issues concerned tariffs, export subsidies for agricultural products and 
limited funds for external actions (which were very little compared with the development aid 
budgets of some member states). As a consequence, the budget in its present form may respond 
to a WTO agreement by changing agricultural policies or by experiencing changes in the tariff 
revenues, but it does not directly react to changing trade circumstances. This section describes 
the mechanisms of this influence from a theoretical point of view. Historical and expected 
future developments are treated in subsequent sections. 
2.1  Issues addressed at the WTO and the affected EU budget components 
The WTO deals with trade in goods, services, intellectual property, trade disputes and produces 
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For goods, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) is the most advanced area of 
the WTO, which deals with tariff reductions, but also one of the most complicated areas due to 
the exceptional nature of agricultural goods protection. In fact, while agreements on tariff 
reductions started in 1947, these only covered industrial goods and not agricultural products. 
For industrial goods, the EC average level of customs duty protection today amounts to around 
4% and EU tariffs are among the lowest in the world, compared to tariffs in agriculture which 
are for most main products over 50% and can reach up to 200%. It is only in the Uruguay round 
starting in 1986 that agricultural products were included in the talks. Thus, it is not surprising 
that agricultural tariff reductions causes so many difficulties compared to reductions in other 
areas. 
Of course, there are other issues, such as the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), 
TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) and some other specific areas. 
However, these are, despite being major issues, largely overshadowed by the disputes on an 
agreement on agricultural support. In the future, as solutions in the agricultural area are reached, 
other areas of the WTO will increase in importance. In fact, as trade expands to services, a large 
number of controversial areas are expected to develop.  
Other aspects are expected to expand, such as an increased attention to the industrial policies of 
some countries, especially the role of the government in supporting exports in ways not 
previously treated. Today the exchange rate policy of China is under fire, due to its supposed 
strong undervaluation. The US has announced its intention on several occasions to challenge 
China in the WTO, despite the fact that WTO does not have any clear rules on exchange rates. 
But for the present round, agriculture is still the focus aspect of the negotiations. 
2.2  The EU budget, trade and tariffs – the theory 
Trade flow changes and trade agreements can have three distinct effects on the EU budget. 
Firstly it can affect the EU budget revenue through the effects on the customs tariff, which is 
part of the Traditional Own Resources. Secondly it can change EU common policies to adapt 
them to newly agreed rules on tariffs and allowed domestic subsidies or non-tariff barriers. The 
third effect is more implicit and indirect: the adaptation of the objectives of the budget to help 
the EU to face new challenges that emerge from changes in its trade relationships. 
2.3  Tariffs and customs revenues 
The EU’s main objective in imposing customs tariffs is to protect internal production from 
cheaper imports. CCT revenues are not very high, as tariffs are generally low for most 
manufactured goods. The most significant tariffs of the EU are concentrated on agricultural 
products and are an integral part of the mechanisms to sustain internal prices of agricultural 
products. In contrast, customs tariffs for developing countries are often one of the main sources 
of government income.  
Tariffs also represent the only accepted means for limiting trade (with the exception of non-
tariff barriers based on standards, such as agreed Sanitary and Phytosanitary – SPS – measures). 
With the conclusion of the Uruguay round of the WTO in 1994, all countries have to switch 
from quantitative restrictions (such as import quotas) to more visible tariff-based mechanisms, 
based on values. The only quantity restrictions allowed are for imports under preferential tariffs 
below the normal rate. 
The most common tariffs in the EU and most OECD countries are ad-valorem, a percentage of 
the value of the imported product. Specific tariffs that levy a tax on a quantity imported 
regardless of the value are also common in many countries. These two tariffs are often 4 | KERNOHAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & SCHNEIDER 
 
combined, with ad-valorem and specific tariffs applied on the same item. The WTO imposes 
limits on the overall value of the tariffs as a percentage of the value of imports. 
2.4  Impacts of changes in tariff barriers  
The WTO process addresses primarily the level of tariff barriers, bringing these down to 
increase trade flows and global welfare. A reduction in tariffs can have implications on the level 
of customs revenues, trade flows, internal market prices and consequently production and 
consumption. Thus, while agreements on the levels of tariffs directly affect tariff revenues, 
secondary effects can trigger a need to adapt EU common policies and even objectives of the 
budget. Figure 1 depicts the effects in a diagram, followed by an explanation. 
Figure 1. Impacts of reduction in tariff barriers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement on reduction in 
tariff barriers 
Reduction in tariff revenue per unit of import and thus 
reduction in internal market price for imported good 
Demand increases for imported product 
Domestic substitute products likely to need to reduce 
prices to compete 
Imports 
Tariffs are reduced in other countries. EU export 
goods become cheaper internationally. EU exports 
can grow. 
Exports 
Prices, production and consumption in 
EU change.  
Net effect depends on competitiveness 
of the EU. 
Effects on EU budget revenue: 
Fall in revenue per unit of 
imports; net effect depends on 
increase in imports due to 
demand changes  
Effects on exports: 
Reduction, where 
applicable, of export 
subsidies as EU prices fall 
and EU products become 
cheaper abroad (foreign 
tariffs fall) 
Possible need to adapt EU policies: 
a) Direct need to change direct support 
policies to compete with imported goods, such 
as price support in the CAP 
b) Domestic economic sectors hit by more 
competitive imports may be assisted to adapt 
through EU support 
Primary effects:                        
Secondary effects:                    
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2.4.1  Tariff revenue impacts  
The common custom tariffs (CCT) are part of the EU budget revenues. Thus the first effect of a 
reduction in import tariffs or an increase in preferential import quotas is to reduce the revenue 
per unit of import of the EU budget. These do not, however, necessarily reduce total tariff 
revenues. The following cases are possible: 
a)  Tariffs are extremely high thereby blocking any imports. The reduction in tariffs is not 
sufficient to induce imports. There is no effect. 
b)  Tariffs are effectively blocking any imports. A tariff reduction that triggers imports would 
increase tariff revenues even if the tariff has fallen. 
c)  A reduction in tariff revenue proportional to the reduction in tariffs. This occurs if the fall in 
tariffs does not change the quantity imported.  
d)  A reduction in tariffs causes a reduction in revenues not proportional to the tariff fall. As 
imported goods get cheaper, demand for imports is likely to increase; thus tariff revenues 
will fall less and may even increase if demand is highly reactive to prices (highly elastic). 
Thus the increase in imports could offset the tariff revenue fall. This may occur not only 
because consumers increase their demand for the product, but also because they shift 
demand from domestically produced products to imported products, if these become 
cheaper. 
e)  An increase in preferential access quotas usually reduces tariff revenues. While the effects 
are similar to a fall in tariff revenues, the tariff reduction is granted to a certain group of 
countries only, such as the Association of African and Caribbean countries (ACP) or less 
developed countries (LDCs) through the Everything but Arms Agreement (EBA). This will 
reduce the tariff revenues, if imports from these countries existed or if imports shift from 
those under the higher tariffs to those exporters from the group of countries benefiting from 
preferential trade. Thus the share of imports from under preferential agreements matters. 
Similarly as in d) changes in demand could be so high that if the preferential rate is not zero, 
actual revenues are increasing. This is highly unlikely, but may happen easily if the normal 
rate effectively blocks any imports; thus revenues under the preferential terms would be 
higher than before. 
2.4.2  Secondary effects of tariff changes 
Changes in tariff barriers do not only affect tariff revenues, as shown in the previous section. 
Tariff barriers are a protection of internal domestic production by making foreign goods more 
expensive and thus also allowing higher prices in the internal market for equivalent products. 
Changes in those tariffs may cause changes in demand and supply. These changes could require 
adaptations of other internal policies, such as in the case of price support policies of the CAP. 
They could also trigger changes in the expenditures of the EU budget. Since the costs of 
agricultural export subsidies are linked to international tariff levels, they will fall if these are 
reduced. Furthermore, if the impact of the change in the terms of trade is strong, the EU might 
consider using public intervention methods to assist the affected sectors or regions to adapt.   
A description of the implications for the EU of tariff reductions is given below in three cases: 
where the EU is a net importer, a net exporter or subsidised net exporter. 
EU as an importer 
Figure 2 shows the effect of a fall in tariff barriers, where the EU is an importer. S and D are the 
supply and demand curves for product X. If we assume that WP is the world price and WP
t is 6 | KERNOHAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & SCHNEIDER 
 
the WP with a tariff t, then the initial situation internal production is Q1 with internal prices 
equal to WP
t, which is the expected outcome in a competitive economy. Imports are Q2-Q1 as 
demand is higher than domestic supply at that price. Tariff revenues are the area A+B, the level 
of imports multiplied by the difference between the WP and WP
t. A reduction in tariffs to ‘t 
new’ would reduce the entry price to WP
t new. Under this new tariff, producers would reduce 
production to Q3 and demand would increase to Q4, increasing imports by Q1-Q3 and Q4-Q2. 
Tariff revenues would fall by A, but increase by C and D. Depending on the size of C and D, 
tariff revenue would fall or increase. One can add that the effect of an increase in demand world 
wide of product X would increase WP and attenuate the impacts described. 
Figure 2. Tariff effect if the EU is a net importer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QP in the diagram represents a preferential import quota. Depending on how the allowed import 
quantity has been set. It may or may not affect other production and consumption. Let’s assume 
that in addition to the fall in tariffs, some preferential quotas are given to specific exporters, 
such as developing countries. If allowed imports under the preferential quota are QP – Q4, the 
increased imports would increase consumption but not erode any imports or domestic 
production, with a tariff revenue E (if the preferential tariffs are higher than 0). If the quota is 
larger, either imports are eroded or domestic production or both, with a loss in tariff barriers for 
any products substituted between Q4 and Q3 used by a preferential quota. 
The implications are as follows: Consumers benefit from a reduction in tariffs or an increase in 
the preferential quotas, where more competitive countries gain from the change. The domestic 
economy and other sectors benefit, as the price level of X falls, especially if the imported good 
is an important input for other industries. The internal market benefits as prices fall and the 
productive capacity shifts to more competitive areas. The loser is the particular sector affected. 
While from a purely economic point of view all changes are positive, politically, the effects on 
the affected sectors can be difficult to handle. The adaptation to the more competitive conditions 
is not instantaneous. The changes can cause temporary unemployment increases and if the 
labour market policies are not apt to ease the shift of the unemployed between sectors, this can 
bring additional political pressures. Preferential tariff quotas are positive and benefit the 
consumers without affecting producers or other imports, as long as the cheaper imports are 
taken over by additional demand, not affecting the demand of the remaining production. 
Under higher international competition, companies can no longer work with a cost structure that 
is higher than the cost structure of imports (including transport and tariffs). Reducing production 
is, however, not the only option, because companies can restructure and increase their 
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competitiveness, shifting the S curve out, i.e. producing more at the same price, and/or can also 
increase quality, differentiating the domestic product from foreign imports allowing for a higher 
price than the imported lower quality products.  
Therefore the implications for the EU budget are, that firstly there is the obvious effect on the 
tariff revenues, but secondly, that the EU may decide to use its budget to gain competitiveness, 
either by assisting the shift of resources away from product X (for example retraining of the 
redundant workforce) and/or offering financial assistance to the sector to increase its 
competitiveness (shifting the supply curve S, more products for same price) and/or improving 
quality, thus creating a differentiated product (see for example clothing brands or organic 
produce and protected designation of origin in agriculture). The Lisbon strategy of the EU is the 
development of such assistance, as are promotion and quality policies of the CAP. 
EU as an exporter 
The budget implications in the case where the EU is a competitive exporter and has no imports 
should be non-existent, although the EU might help to increase competitiveness and further 
exports. In the case where the EU is an importer and exporter, the tariff income effect is more 
difficult to describe. If products were absolutely perfect substitutes and the EU produces more 
than it consumes and exports at the WP, there is no reason for the existence of imports with 
tariffs, otherwise products are clearly similar but not perfect substitutes.  
A tariff fall would perhaps increase the imports of the product depending on the demand of the 
specific product, but it would not erode much of the domestic product, which is competitive due 
to price/quality factors; thus a fall would most likely be limited to a tariff revenue loss without 
much income from extra imports.  
EU as a subsidised exporter 
Export subsidies are a controversial policy of the EU for the agricultural sector and are used to 
sustain internal market prices at a higher level than world market prices. A fall in tariff barriers 
has a number of serious implications for these products and the EU budget. 
Figure 3. Tariff implications: EU is a subsidised exporter 
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If we first assume that the EU imposes a tariff t, which effectively blocks any imports the EU 
exports with subsidies. Then the EU introduces an intervention price P
int which is above the 
internal market equilibrium price P
e; thus EU production exceeds EU demand by Q4-Q3. 
Consumers are the main losers. Producers are the winners from price support, producing Q4-Q1 
more. However, the excess production under P
int cannot be sold at the world market and the EU 
accumulates excess production equal to Q4-Q3. To solve the problem, the EU exports this 
amount to the world market under price WP, at the EU budget expense of the shaded area, 
which is the difference of the intervention price with the world price multiplied by the quantity 
exported. Under free world prices, the price drops to WP and demand increases to Q2-Q3. 
Changes in tariffs can have important implications for a case like this, and explains the need for 
the reform of the CAP which reduced the intervention price. If an agreement at the WTO is 
reached that reduces tariffs to a level where WP
t ends below the P
int, the EU would need to 
reduce P
int. Price support policies are incompatible with reduction in tariffs barriers, as any other 
barrier to imports is not permitted.    
Similarly, a limitation of export subsidies in volume or quantity below the levels required to 
maintain P
int is unsustainable unless demand increases or supply falls. Supply can fall without 
reducing P
int by introducing a production quota. The EU has often required both, price support 
reductions and quantity reduction mechanisms (quotas for dairy and sugar or set-aside for 
cereals) to keep under WTO commitments. However, as trade is liberalised for agricultural 
products, P
int needs to be lowered. In the case depicted above, a fall of P
int towards WP can turn 
the EU into a net importer. These shifts in the prices and production have repercussions on the 
sector affected.  
The reduction in intervention prices has a general positive effect for the economy, with 
consumer welfare increasing as prices fall and a reduction in the expenditure for export 
subsidies, which is a deadweight loss and a cost to the taxpayers, who pay twice, as consumers 
and taxpayers. 
The implications for the EU budget are numerous. The EU has attempted to cushion agricultural 
producers from the effects of reduced support by introducing direct payments and supporting 
the restructuring process through rural development funds, which have increased the budget 
expenditures in this sector. Any reduction in support, however, reduces the export subsidy 
expenditures, which is a savings for the CAP budget. The historical overview of the impacts of 
the WTO on the budget and policies are discussed in section 3. 
2.5  Other implications of trade and WTO negotiations for the EU budget 
Strictly speaking and from a purely theoretical point of view, which this section presents, there 
is no direct link between the EU budget and trade issues beyond the necessary changes caused 
by tariff and export subsidy mechanisms. There are, however, some possible indirect 
implications caused by the TBTs (technical barriers to trade) and SPS (sanitary and 
phytosanitary) rules. Non-tariff barriers can affect the level of imports of goods to the EU, 
which in turn affect the tariff revenues. Otherwise other links relate to a political decision to 
shift the objectives of the budget to address trade issues.  
2.5.1  Impacts of non-tariff barriers on tariff revenues 
TBTs are usually safety standards for materials or machinery and are based on scientifically 
sound risk assessments. Under these rules also fall labelling requirements for consumer 
information, certification of origin and quality or production methods. While most of the rules 
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with and can cause strong barriers to trade, especially for developing countries. Thus, TBTs also 
create a certain level of market protection. They also can reduce imports, which on the one hand 
reduce CCT revenues, but increase the value and quality of the actual imported good on the 
other, potentially increasing CCT since ad-valorem tariffs are then higher per unit. 
For agriculture, TBTs for food safety are important. They are treated separately in the SPS 
agreements and constitute one of the WTO instruments that can have clear impacts on imports. 
High food safety requirements can reduce the level of imports of certain products. Especially in 
the cases of meat and seafood products, the standards effectively do not allow imports from a 
number of countries and reduces the imports from cheap sub-standard products from abroad. 
The WTO allows a certain level of flexibility on the choices of countries on food safety 
standards and the EU has one of the strictest regimes in the world. The implications are likely 
lower CCT revenues, but also higher value imports, which increase revenues of ad-valorem 
tariffs. The expenditures from the budget can be affected, as this protection eases the price 
effect of liberalisation, but also increases the need for support to domestic producers to 
guarantee the high standards. Nevertheless, many importers adapt to the rules, and while some 
countries can find it difficult to comply, this often just alters the country of origin of the 
products rather than reduces imports. 
2.5.2  Impacts of increased trade competition on EU expenditures  
From a general theoretical point of view, increased trade liberalisation should induce the EU’s 
public sector to intensify efforts to foster competitiveness. This includes decisions at EU level 
and can affect the EU budget expenditure objectives and structure. However, the EU budget is 
the result of a complicated agreement at supranational level, is limited in size and scope, and is 
very complicated to alter, requiring the unanimous agreement of all the member states. 
The consequence of these deficiencies is that it is difficult to use the budget as a tool to address 
trade implications directly. Fostering competitiveness also largely depends on macroeconomic 
policies of the member states: labour market rules, fiscal policies, education system, etc. The 
EU budget can play only a limited role.  
However, the EU budget has policies directly aimed at countries or regions with a low GDP per 
capita and industrial regions in decline (cohesion funds, and Objective 1 and 2 of the structural 
funds). These are mainly investment funds to increase the physical and human capital stock of 
regions lagging behind. This support is indirectly relevant in the EU’s response to trade impacts. 
While the policies were designed with the internal market in mind and not international trade, 
these investments help regions affected by adverse terms of trade, both within the EU and as a 
result of external trade implications. A recrudescence in external trade competition would 
induce pressure to improve the appropriateness of the funds and alter the priorities of the 
member states’ programmes to better address the international trade challenge ahead.  
The agricultural policy has been adapted to the WTO liberalisation process. As a policy using 
trade as a means to protect internal prices, it was not designed to actually compete with external 
producers. The EU has had to fit the CAP to new rules. Lately, however, the EU has started to 
change the CAP not to fit the WTO agreements but to influence them. In the future the EU can 
choose to further change its reactive stance to WTO development to one of anticipation and 
active engagement, by increasing the focus on competitiveness and finding mechanisms to 
protect the EU’s interests in this area (such as preservation of the European countryside through 
rural development measures) and by improving the design of the policy mechanisms.  
The EU has seen a start in the transformation of its policies and section 3 explains how. Section 
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that actively seeks to improve the EU’s position in international trade and also preserves the 
EU’s non-trade interests. 
3.  WTO effects on the EU budget and expenditures 
The decisions at the WTO and the trade liberalisation process have influenced the EU budget in 
size, resource composition and objectives.  
These effects have however been limited to two areas of the budget: 
a)  The reduction in tariffs has affected the size of the custom tariff revenues, thereby affecting 
the Own Resources. 
b)  The introduction of agriculture into the negotiations with the Uruguay round (1986-1994) 
has strongly affected the CAP and the EU budget structure. 
3.1  Effects on the resources of the European Union 
On the resources side, multilateral trade agreements have considerably reduced tariff barriers, 
thus partially reducing the share in Traditional Own Resources (TOR) in the resource 
composition of the EU budget.  
CCT revenues for industrial goods have been considerably reduced since the start of multilateral 
trade negotiations, although meaningful data on CCT revenues for the years before the 1980s 
are difficult to find. Given the increase in the number of member states, the figures are also not 
easy to compare to today’s totals. This section concentrates on the impact of the Uruguay round 
commitments on CCT revenues. By the time the Uruguay round started, the level of tariffs for 
manufactured goods was already quite low. High tariffs were to be found for agricultural 
products and it is on those that the Uruguay round concentrated. An agreement was reached to 
reduce the tariff levels in the agricultural sector by an average of 36%. 
It is interesting to note, however, that the impact of the Uruguay round reforms on customs tariff 
revenue appears to have been negligible. There are two reasons for this: Agricultural tariffs, 
even if high, did not account for a large part of the revenues (only around 10%) and second, 
because tariffs were in various items prohibitively high. With this ‘tariff slack’, it was possible 
to distribute the tariff reduction commitments without changing trade flows or affecting tariff 
revenues.  
Customs tariff receipts remained fairly constant during the period 1992-99, at between €13,000 
million and €14,000 million per year, despite the fact that, according to the GATT commitments 
implementation had to start in 1995.   
After the year 2000, the TOR fell to approximately €10,000 million, but this is almost entirely 
attributable to the Own Resources agreement of 1999, which allowed member states to retain 
25% of the CCT revenues as collection costs compared to the previous 10%. The next round of 
WTO negotiations should, however, have a larger impact on TOR, as the proposal is to 
implement measures that will ensure tariffs are reduced effectively, with higher reductions for 
higher tariffs. 
3.2  Effects on the expenditures of the EU budget 
Certainly the most important impacts on the EU budget of the changing pattern of trade 
negotiations has been to induce the EU to change its agricultural policy. This happened under 
the Uruguay round with the MacSharry reforms and it is very likely that the DDA process had 
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The introduction of agriculture as part of the negotiations for trade liberalisation has had 
considerable impacts on the budget. The Uruguay round of agricultural negotiations was 
instrumental in inducing the 1992 CAP reform and played an important part in framing the next 
generation of reforms – the Agenda 2000 and the mid-term review of the CAP. In practice, the 
rules of the WTO on the maximum levels of support have constrained the policy alternatives of 
the EU and required a rethink of the foundations of the policy.  
Direct and tangible effects of the 1992 reforms were an increase in the expenditure of the CAP 
as support shifted from price support to direct payments (thus from support based on consumer 
transfers to one based on taxpayer transfers), a fall in the size of subsidised exports and some 
fall in the tariff revenues of the EU. While many would claim that the EU would have had to 
change direction anyway, which is true in principle, the WTO framework set the pressure to act 
and also determined the form. 
The CAP budget during the period of 1988-91 stood at around €28,000 million a year, of which 
over 90% was spent on intervention buying and subsidised exports (approximately €10,000 
million a year). With the reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, the expenses on 
intervention and export subsidies decreased, while the costs of direct payments and rural 
development measures increased considerably. The net effect has been an increase in the EU 
budget by approximately 40% reaching €44,461 million in 2003. The lowering of export 
subsidies by €6,500-7,000 million has been crucial in dampening the budgetary cost increase 
caused by the increase in direct payments. After the Agenda 2000 reforms, export subsidies 
accounted for an average of €3,500 million a year between 2001-03. Today the fall of the US 
dollar has affected the external competitiveness of agricultural products, and export subsidies 
have in fact risen to around €4,000 million in 2004.    
But changes were not only ‘passive’. There has also been a redirection in the objectives of EU 
expenditure. Rural development funds are now investing in the competitiveness of agricultural 
sectors and promoting an increase in product quality. The EU is mainly a processed food 
exporter. Exports of specialised products are one of the main strategies for improving the export 
competitiveness of agricultural products while preserving a price premium.  
Direct payments originate from the requirements to reduce tariff barriers and trade-distorting 
export subsidies and are seen as a means to protect against the abandonment of agricultural land 
and rural areas feared after a liberalisation of trade and the expected price falls. These measures 
also serve other functions through cross-compliance, such as the use of better agricultural 
practices.  
Through the TRIPS agreement, the EU has managed to achieve a level of protection through the 
certification of origin of agricultural products, allowing EU products to have their names of 
origin protected in international markets (e.g. Champagne) guaranteeing its provenance and 
quality. The EU budget has fostered the expansion of certified quality products, which in turn 
increases Europe’s competitiveness. 
Food safety rules are also increasing in importance, which in one sense increases the costs of 
production and reduces the competitiveness of EU products when the standards are beyond 
those required in foreign markets. However, the standards can also have indirect effects. 
Imported goods have to fulfil the EU’s internal standards, and high standards for food safety are 
equivalent to a non-tariff barrier. Lately the SPS rules have become stricter, which makes 
imports into the EU harder. This can also reduce tariff revenues. EU budget expenditures for 
rural development have increased under the latest CAP reforms, incorporating new expenditures 
to help producers comply with the new standards.  
However, these changes have not only been limited to agricultural expenditure. The EU has 
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investment, but increasing significantly the role of the funds in building human capital through 
the ESF. This policy, while not necessarily originating in an international trade concern, is 
clearly aimed at increasing the competitiveness of Europe. If the European economy is hit by 
trade-related competition in certain sectors and regions, the ESF gains in importance. Countries 
draw their development plans based on the situation in the economy, and if international 
competitiveness is a problem, EU funds are used to foster competitiveness. 
The Financial Perspectives for the period 2007-13 formally acknowledge the need for an 
increasing role of the budget and adopted a more reactive, albeit modest, stance towards the 
increasing influence on the European economy of the trade liberalisation process. This is 
discussed in section 3.3.1. 
3.3  Effects on the budgetary net balances of the European Union 
As mentioned earlier, the agreements on tariff reductions at the Uruguay round had no tangible 
effect on tariff revenues and thus no effect on net balances. In any case, changes in tariff 
revenues alone while affecting the actual contributions of the member states are not visible in 
the official net balance calculations as presented by the European Commission.  
The receipts of the traditional Own Resources are considered a fiscal resource fully ‘owned’ by 
the EU; thus the method for calculating net balances has been devised in such a way as to 
exclude changes in the TOR from net balances. The receipts from customs tariffs or agricultural 
levies are redistributed as if originating as a share of GNI from the member states. Any 
redistribution of CCT receipts or change in the size of the revenue will not be visible.   
The official net balances of member states are however affected by the induced changes in the 
CAP. The shift in support from price support to direct payments increased the expenditure and 
thus the contributions of the member states, while countries with large supported sectors of 
agriculture saw their receipts from the EU budget increase considerably. Depending on the 
relationship between contributions and CAP returns, the net balances have been affected. Clear 
net beneficiaries from this change in the agricultural policy appear to be France and Spain. 
Despite the rise in structural operations, of which France is not a main beneficiary, France’s net 
contribution at the end of the period had fallen. For Spain, it simply added to the large increase 
in the net balances due to the increase in structural operations (European Commission, 1998a). 
3.3.1  Effects on the policy orientations 
The WTO has been instrumental in bringing the EU towards a reconsideration of the 
development strategy of the agricultural sector for rural areas. The policy probably needed to be 
adapted anyway but in 1992, when the McSharry reforms shifted the policy orientation towards 
direct payments, a strategic vision of the kind of agriculture the EU was aiming to support and 
an integrated strategy for the development of rural areas were missing.  
Hence, the WTO process has certainly injected impetus into developing the underlying 
definition of the term ‘multifunctionality of agriculture’ and into developing the operational 
structures for the agricultural policy: reinforcing and reorienting the rural development side of 
agricultural policy and increasing the environmental conditionality of direct payments. It has 
therefore induced a complete rethink of the priorities behind agricultural policy, abandoning the 
notion that competitiveness has to equal product-related subsidies, and allowing the introduction 
of decoupled payments. 
The EU has also started a radical change in the underlying principles of rural development. In 
the pursuit of ways to protect the interests of the European Union in the agricultural sector, it 
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rural areas. The notion that the development of rural areas depends on agriculture has been 
partially abandoned. The WTO process has given an impetus to the process of finding methods 
to support the growth potential of rural areas. The importance of rural development measures 
would have certainly increased regardless of the trade developments, but without the pressure to 
face stringent commitments on subsidies and the increased external competitive pressure, the 
process would most likely have occurred later. In any case the terms ‘multifunctionality of 
agriculture’ and the ‘protection of the European model of agriculture’, which are the 
philosophical foundations on which rural development support is being built, originate from the 
EU’s negotiation positions at the WTO (European Commission, 1998b). 
The importance of these changes are particularly visible in the creation of a rural development 
sub-heading in the proposed financial perspectives for the 2007-13 period, integrating the funds 
of the guidance section of the EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund)  
with the guarantee rural development measures.  
The next round of the WTO will push further in this direction, with the important difference 
being that the EU has defined a strategy to approach its problems in the agricultural sector 
eliminating the trade distortions that the WTO challenges. The EU, rather than adapting its 
policies to fit the WTO, will play a much stronger role in ensuring that this time the agenda is 
set by the EU rather than by the US or other WTO members. 
For other sectors, the effects on the EU budget are indirect and not solely attributable to the 
WTO. The WTO is also a body created as a response to a growing globalisation process to 
allow countries to have an integrated approach to the increase in international trade. The 
globalisation process would have required a rethink of the EU’s policy orientation in any event. 
The WTO, however, sets the rules of engagement and thus affects the EU’s reactions. The 
influences are particularly visible in the Financial Perspectives of the EU for 2007-13 
(COM(2004) 487 final), where international trade is repeatedly mentioned as a reason to 
redirect the EU’s priorities and increase budget expenditures to foster competitiveness.  
The EU is starting to introduce trade concerns into the EU budget. The new proposed 
amendment to the objectives of the budget explicitly started adopting a more reactive albeit 
modest stance towards the increasing influence on the European economy of the trade 
liberalisation process. The proposals to reform the Own Resources would affect the internal 
distribution of the budget burden, but still maintain unchanged the custom tariff resource key. 
The new EU budget reduces the number of headings and increases the flexibility amongst them. 
Those headings are Sustainable Growth, Preservation and Management of Natural Resources, 
Citizenship, Freedom, Security and Justice, the EU as a Global Partner, and Administration. 
Much of the difference with the old budget structure is a redistribution of the headings of the old 
budget, which now are classified as subheadings in the new structure. The CAP is under Natural 
Resources and the structural funds under the Sustainable Growth headings.  
However, the proposed budget structure has some innovations that are relevant to the trade 
liberalisation process. With the realisation that the EU needs to adapt better to global challenges, 
it has created a new sub-heading under Sustainable Growth, namely ‘Competitiveness for 
Growth and Employment’, which should assist the EU to gain a comparative advantage in the 
knowledge economy or high-tech sectors vis-à-vis trading partners. Furthermore, the 
Commission has proposed a Growth Adjustment Fund, which can be used for boosting 
important EU initiatives and ‘help respond to unexpected shocks – such as trade disputes or 
unexpected consequences of trade agreements’ (p. 15). Finally, the EU has increased the 
funding for external actions considerably. Increasing the EU’s weight internationally should 
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However, the EU budget in its present or proposed form can do little to address many of the 
pressures on the EU stemming from the trade liberalisation process. The EU budget can also 
have little influence in the process of adaptation of the EU to new challenges, since much of the 
work has to fall on the governments of the member states through macroeconomic policy 
reforms. 
There are in fact no immediate direct links to the EU budget outside the sphere of tariffs and 
agricultural export subsidies. However, the process of liberalisation can induce political 
pressure to adapt the budget. 
4.  Likely impacts of a successful DDA trade round 
This section is divided into two main parts. The first describes the situation in the present round 
of negotiations and the most likely outcomes. On the basis of this analysis, the expected impacts 
on the EU and its budget are estimated with the assistance of two models. The first model 
analyses the impact on the agricultural sector and the subsequent impact on tariff revenues and 
on EU budget expenditures. The second model analyses how these changes are reflected in the 
net balances of the EU. The section concludes with some additional reflections on the complex 
sugar policy reform. 
4.1  The objectives of the DDA  
At its fourth ministerial conference in Doha (Qatar) in November 2001, the WTO concluded 
some far-reaching decisions on the future development of the organisation. The centrepiece of 
the conclusions was to launch a new round of trade negotiations – the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) – comprising both further trade liberalisation and new rule-making, underpinned 
by commitments to strengthen assistance to developing countries.  
In addition, it was also agreed to help developing countries implement the existing WTO 
agreements and to interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a manner that ensures members’ rights to 
take action to protect public health.  
With the DDA, the WTO has attempted to move into a new era. This is because, besides a 
continued commitment to improving conditions for worldwide trade and investment, it should 
also be able to play a much fuller role in the pursuit of economic growth, employment and 
poverty reduction through enhanced and better rules. Better international governance and the 
promotion of sustainable development are claimed to be the ambitious backdrop to the agenda.  
The launch of the DDA with a development-focused agenda was also in line with the EU’s new 
policy approach. This advocated a mandate based on agriculture negotiations, as well as on 
industrial products, services, intellectual property (geographical indications and TRIPs), the four 
‘Singapore issues’,
1 WTO rules
2 and trade and the environment.   
According to the mandate adopted on 14 November 2001 in Doha, the WTO members 
committed themselves to substantially improving market access, reducing (with a view to 
phasing out) all forms of export subsidies and substantially reducing trade-distorting domestic 
support (WTO, 2001). Furthermore, it was also agreed that non-trade concerns and special and 
differential treatment for developing countries should become an integral feature of the 
negotiations. 
                                                      
1 Investment, competition, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation. 
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However, the process of the negotiations has not been smooth. The steps needed to agree on the 
modalities were only negotiated with difficulty, most notably at the ministerial meeting in 
Cancún in September 2003, derailing further the negotiations until July 2004 when modalities 
were finally agreed in Geneva. Although even here, the document itself is light on precise 
details compared to past rounds of negotiations at a similar stage.  
The question of greater market access in industrial goods was the core of the negotiations prior 
to the Uruguay round. The Uruguay round and now the DDA has moved on to attempt 
something similar in agriculture. However, agriculture looms large for developing countries as a 
protected sector and an export opportunity. Since the instruments used for protecting 
agricultural markets also generate tariff revenues, as with the Uruguay round, the DDA 
discussions have mainly become a single-issue negotiation, focused on agriculture. 
The Framework Agreement from July 2004, if put into practice, would deliver a considerably 
larger farm-trade liberalisation. It would bring a substantial cut in trade-distorting agricultural 
support, the elimination of trade distorting export competition practices and a significant 
opening of agricultural markets.  
4.1.1 Agriculture 
The Doha work programme comprises an overall cut of all trade-distorting domestic support 
according to a tiered formula. Under this formula, higher levels of trade-distorting domestic 
support will be subject to deeper cuts in order to achieve a harmonised result. Furthermore, all 
developed countries would commit themselves to a downpayment of 20% of their scheduled 
tariff reduction commitments in the first year. The cut would be based on the present bound 
rates (rates of maximum tariff agreed in the Uruguay round). The reductions would be required 
for all members other than the LDCs. Countries can self-select sensitive products that would be 
treated in a more flexible way. As compensation, the tariff rate quotas (TQRs) of sensitive 
products have to be expanded. 
Furthermore, a reduction of the de minimis loophole
3 will be negotiated and the criteria for the 
Green Box
4 will be reviewed. The Blue Box support should not exceed 5% of the average total 
value of agricultural production during an historical reference period that has yet to be specified. 
This stands in contrast to the Derbez text
5, which suggests dates for the reference period (2000-
02) and linear reductions for (x) number of years (ICTSD, 2004).  
Under export competition, the Doha work programme also addresses the elimination of all 
forms of export support. The EU has managed to introduce into the negotiations the elimination 
of all other forms of trade-distorting export-support measures, such as export credits, export 
credit guarantees or insurance programmes with repayment periods beyond 180 days. Export 
credits of less than 180 days and trade-distorting practices of state-trading enterprises (STES) 
                                                      
3  Level of support that is exempt from commitments, presently at 5% of the value of agricultural 
production for developed countries and 10% for developing countries. 
4 Within the WTO, subsidies are categorised in coloured boxes according to the level of trade distortion 
they generate. The red are banned subsidies, amber are distortive subsidies that are bound to limitations, 
blue box are specific subsides of the EU and the US which were exempt from the limits in the amber box 
but could be challenged since 2003 (since the latest reform, the EU’s direct payments are expected to fall 
into the green box) and the green box are non-trade-distorting policies which are not subject to any 
limitations.  
5  Text presented by Chairperson Luis Ernesto Derbez on the fourth day of the Cancún Ministerial 
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should be subject to strict discipline. Moreover, food aid schemes should be clearly disciplined, 
eliminating the use of food aid as a hidden mechanism for surplus displacement.  
For developing countries, special and differential treatment  will be provided. They will be 
accorded longer implementation periods, lower tariff and subsidy cuts and special concessions 
for their market access. Furthermore, trade in tropical products will be fully liberalised and the 
erosion of trade preferences will be addressed. LDCs do not have to lower their tariffs or their 
domestic farm support. Developed countries and capable developing countries should provide 
duty and quota-free market access for LDC products (European Commission, 2004b). 
The EU would be committed to a considerable degree of market opening, but will also look for 
comfort for certain ‘sensitive’ products. The EU already imports as much agricultural produce 
from the developing world as the US, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand put together. 
It is important to acknowledge that all countries have market access barriers, whereas only some 
have export subsidies or amber or blue box domestic supports. Therefore the range of interests 
involved in the market access side of the negotiations is more complex. Most governments are 
under pressure to protect their farmers, but many also want to export and therefore want to see 
other countries’ markets open up. Among developing countries, some are less confident about 
importing and exporting and take a defensive stance, while others are more confident and want 
to see more South-South trade as well as increased exports from poorer to richer countries. 
4.2  Modelling the effects of a DDA agreement on the EU budget 
For the EU budget, the strongest impact from an agreement will be felt in the agricultural sector. 
Thus the analysis concentrates on this sector. However, the results are also fed to a General 
Equilibrium Model that incorporates the changes for the other economic sectors. The analyses 
on the agricultural sector and tariff revenues implications of an agreement are based on the 
comparative static standard multi-regional general equilibrium Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) model used by FAL
6 (see Annex 4 for a description). It provides an elaborate 
representation of the economy, including the linkages between farming, agribusiness and 
industrial, and service sectors of the economy.  
4.2.1  The likely implication of the framework agreement 
The framework agreement commits members to “substantial improvements in market access for 
all products”. Some key points emerged in the bargaining over the framework: the type of tariff 
reduction formula that would bring “substantial improvements in market access”; the treatment 
of sensitive products and safeguard actions to protect those; the treatment of conflicting interests 
among developing countries; market access for tropical products  and crops grown as 
alternatives to illicit narcotics; developed countries’ subsidies and improved market access in 
developing countries. This model concentrates on market access, which is the area that has 
implications for the EU. 
The discussion has focused broadly on the high levels of tariffs outside preferential access 
quotas and the quotas themselves. Two methods for tariff reductions are at the forefront of the 
negotiations and are considered by the authors as the most likely formulae for a decision: the 
Harbinson 1½ approach
7 and the so-called ‘Swiss Formula’.  
                                                      
6 Federal Agricultural Research Centre (Braunschweig, Germany) 
7 The ‘Harbinson 1½ proposal’ is the revised form of the Harbinson proposal, which was presented to the 
WTO on 12 February 2003, by Stuart Harbinson, Chair of the special (negotiating) session of the WTO THE EU BUDGET PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION | 17 
 
The Harbinson approach 
The Harbison 1½ paper calls for substantial reductions to the Aggregate Measure of Support 
(AMS),
8 for the blue box and for de minimis support
9 in developed countries. In addition, it calls 
for the elimination of export subsidies within two staggered categories (five and nine years). 
Export credits, export credit guarantees and insurance programmes as well as international food 
aid and state-trading export enterprises shall be subject to disciplines. 
For tariffs it proposed for developed countries (which includes the EU) reductions over 5 years 
and increases in TRQ. For developing countries, special and differential treatment is proposed 
with reduction categories of 10 and 12 years. Table 1 presents the proposed cuts for the tariff in 
ad valorem equivalents. 
Table 1. Tariff reduction formulas of the Harbinson 1 ½ proposal (%) 
  Initial tariff rate 
(ad valorem) 
Average 
reduction rate 
Minimum cut 
 >  90  60  45 
Developed countries  ≤ 90 and > 15  50 35 
  ≤ 15  40 25 
 >  120  40  30 
Developing countries  ≤ 120 and > 60  35 25 
  ≤ 60 and > 20  30 20 
  ≤ 20  25 15 
Source: Based on proposals in WTO (2003). 
In addition to the special and differential treatment for developing countries, the Harbinson 1½ 
paper accords special treatment for least developed countries. They should be exempt from any 
reduction commitments and developed countries should provide duty and quota-free market 
access for all imports from developing countries. 
The Swiss formula 
In the course of the negotiations held in the Uruguay round, the Swiss formula was an approach 
proposed by Switzerland concerning tariff cuts in the field of industrial commodities. According 
to this formula, the new tariff rate is determined by the base rate (T0) and a coefficient (a): T1 = 
(T0 * a) / (T0 + a). In the current agricultural negotiations of the Doha round, the US proposed 
applying a coefficient value of 25 to this formula. Under these conditions, all tariff rates on 
agricultural products will be harmonised at a level below 25% within a five-year period through 
a non-linear reduction process. Since tariff cuts based on the Swiss formula are dependent on 
the level of the base rate, it brings about larger reductions in the highest tariff rates. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Committee. This paper was not well received, however, and a partial revision was made; therefore the 
name ‘Harbinson 1½’, which can be found in some academic literature, is also used here. 
8 AMS is an estimated value of the subsidies to the agricultural sector that are considered trade-distorting 
(amber box). 
9 Level of support exempt from commitments, presently at 5% of the value of agriculture production for 
developed and 10% for developing countries. 18 | KERNOHAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & SCHNEIDER 
 
The dispute on the ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) 
The WTO members are disputing the methods used for the estimation of the ad-valorem 
equivalent (AVE) tariffs (overall rate of specific and ad-valorem tariffs) for the calculation of 
the commitments. AVE attempts to simplify the calculations to avoid a detailed estimation 
based on every individual product and its price. Cuts should be based on an average overall 
AVE for a goods category rather than by the individual imported good. The original idea was to 
use the average world price as the average entry price for a product and assume that the AVE is 
the difference between the world price and the EU price after tariffs. 
The EU cannot accept this. Due to the EU high standards on food safety and technical 
specifications (including packaging), the imported price of an agricultural product is higher 
before tariffs; thus this method would strongly overestimate the tariff rates of the EU. A dispute 
is in progress over which percentage price weighting for the EU should be adopted to take into 
account the average additional value of the imports due to quality differences. 
4.3  The scenario analysis  
This paper presents the results of three policy scenarios for the WTO compared to the base, 
which assumes no change in the trade rules.  
Before the actual simulations are carried out, it is necessary to conduct some pre-simulations to 
implement the extended model structure and to update the protection rates. This includes CAP 
instruments and the Common Budget of the EU. 
Figure 4. Base run and simulations 
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Source: Brockmeier et al. (2005, p. 6). 
Based on the results of the pre-simulation, a base run is conducted, which represents a 
projection of the exogenous variables population, GDP and factor endowment up to the year 
2014. Additionally, the AGENDA 2000, the EU enlargement and the EBA agreement, as well THE EU BUDGET PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION | 19 
 
as the MTR are implemented. The sugar and rice quota policies are not ‘adapted’, but are 
assumed abolished. The base run only considers political intervention in the EU-15 and in the 
10 new member states. Developments in other regions, like the Farm Bill of the US, are not 
taken into account. 
Parallel to the base run, a scenario is implemented as well. It takes account the same projections 
and policy shocks (Agenda 2000, EU enlargement, EBA agreement and MTR), but in the time 
period from 2007 to 2014, it additionally includes simulations related to the WTO round. The 
‘July Package’ leaves a lot of room for speculation on how market access will be enabled 
through agricultural trade negotiations. Thus, in the following experiments, various options for 
market access implemented in the Doha round are played through. A total of three simulations 
are carried out. The first two simulations capture the Harbinson 1½ proposal and a possible 
modification, the third presents the case of the Swiss formula.  
In Experiment 01, all countries implement a cut of the import tariffs according to the Harbinson 
1½ proposal, while export subsidies are completely abolished. Experiment 02 is identical to 
Experiment 01, but all other developed countries implement the EU’s EBA initiative by 
granting preferential market access to LDCs. Experiment 03 resembles Experiment 01, but 
countries are obliged to reduce their import tariffs according to the Swiss formula using a 
coefficient of 33
10. The effects of the WTO round are obtained by comparing the results of the 
base run and the scenario in 2014. Table 2 summarises the simulations. 
Table 2. WTO Simulations 
  Import Tariff Cut  EBA Adopted in 
Experiment  Harbinson 1½  Swiss formula  Developed countries 
01  X     
02  X    X 
03    X   
Source: Brockmeier et al. (2005, p. 9). 
4.3.1  Model results for the agricultural sector and the EU budget 
The model presents results for the changes in net trade balances and related changes in CAP 
expenditure and impacts in tariff revenues. Table 3 presents the results for all the scenarios on 
the trade balance. 
The first results show that the overall trade balance for the EU is favourable in all three 
scenarios, but that the situation is highly variable between products and the impact is highly 
negative for the agricultural sector in terms of trade balances. The results of the manufacturing 
and services sector are based on a General Equilibrium model in which the date for GTAP was 
fed (see Annex 4). Highly protected products, like beef or vegetables, lose considerably. 
However, trade liberalisation also has surprising positive effects for some products, due to the 
lower tariff barriers of countries to which the EU exports. The model predicts that in the dairy 
sector, which is one of the most protected sectors in the world, the EU would gain from the 
increased market access to other countries.  
 
                                                      
10 This is higher than the originally proposed 25, but the modellers considered an agreement impossible at 
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Table 3. Changes in EU net trade balances of the simulations ($ million) 
  01 02 03 
Wheat -108  -100  97 
Other  crops  -618 -619 -498 
Oil seeds  199  198  152 
Rice  -124 -124 -176 
Vegetables, fruits  -1338  -1287  -641 
Cattle 250  248  600 
Other animal products  352  353  459 
Beef  -2672 -2673 -4068 
Other meat products  -228  -227  76 
Vegetable oils and fats  -693  -688  -95 
Dairy products  223  226  1014 
Sugar 797  794  969 
Other food products  -5838  -5724  -4962 
Beverages and tobacco  356  346  379 
Primary products  153  163  136 
Total  agricultural  -9289 -9014 -6558 
Manufactures  6109 6192 3480 
Services  3648 3790 3650 
Overall total  468 868 572 
Source: Brockmeier et al. (2005, p. 11). 
An implementation of the proposals of the Harbinson paper has a negative effect on the trade 
balances in the EU-27 for wheat, other cereals, rice, fruit, vegetables and plant products, as well 
as the processed oil and fat products, which show losses between €-688 million and €-693 
million. A global liberalisation of agricultural trade leads to a relative increase in imports vs. 
exports for beef as well as pork and poultry meat production, resulting in a drop of the EU trade 
balance of €-2,672 million. The implementation of the Harbinson paper, however, has a positive 
effect on the EU trade balance for oil seeds (€199 million), milk and dairy products (€223 
million) and sugar (€794 to €797 million).  
The model also shows a positive development for sugar. This is caused by the fall in imports 
from ACPs and LDCs as the preferences are eroded, i.e. their prices are reduced as the EU 
internal price falls due to the tariff cuts. This fall in preferential imports is not replaced 
completely by imports from other exporters, thus creating the positive final balance 
improvement, but this is not due to an improvement in the actual trade performance of the 
sector. 
The model results allow for the decomposition of trade effects and the identification of the tariff 
impacts. Figure 5 shows the impacts of the Harbinson proposals. This is the graphical 
description of the different implications of tariff reductions, allowing us to see the complexity of 
the impacts that affect trade flows. 
On the basis of decompositions, the following statements can be made: 
•  The elimination of EU export subsidies (see export subsidy (EU, third countries) in Figure 
5) has a negative effect on the trade balance for other cereals, wheat, dairy products and 
beef. A complete elimination of the export subsidies has a particularly negative influence on 
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•  Other cereals, wheat and in particular dairy products gain from the elimination of import 
duties of third countries against the EU (see import tariffs (EU, third country in Figure 5), 
which has a positive effect on changes in the trade balance. This development is particularly 
significant in the high worldwide protection of dairy products. A less global elimination of 
import tariffs according to the EU recommendations would accordingly lead to losses in 
these areas for the EU. 
•  The reduction in tariffs benefits manufacturing and services, which exceeds the trade 
balance loss in the agricultural sector.  
Figure 5. Decomposition of estimated trade effects of the Harbinson proposal 
 
  
Source: Brockmeier & Salamon (2004, p. 6 of English Executive Summary). Results from a previous 
model analysis for illustration, the latest model runs do not show important differences and have 
not been decomposed. 
4.3.2  Estimated impact on tariff revenues 
The GTAP model has estimated the impact on tariffs listed in the Table 4, and is estimated at 
approximately 5% of the tariff revenue or approximately €1,000 million in all scenarios. For the 
agricultural sector the fall is more significant in percentage, but it only accounts for a fraction of 
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Table 4. Overall tariff revenues implications (% change) 
TOR and tariff revenues (% change to base scenario) 
   01  02  03 
European Union total    -5 %  -5 %  -5 % 
Agricultural sector    -20 %  -19 %  -21 % 
TOR and tariff revenues in € million 
TOR 10355  9407  9395  9406 
of which Agriculture CCT  866  695  698  683 
 
As the results show, the fall in tariff revenues is not expected to be counterbalanced by 
increased revenues from imports. The tariff revenue impact in the agricultural sector is higher 
with the Swiss formula, as it focuses more sharply on cutting high tariffs. The tariff revenue fall 
of agricultural products is also much higher as the high tariffs are accumulated in particular in 
the agricultural products. 
4.3.3  Estimated direct impacts on the CAP budget 
The base scenario assumes that the EU budget in the no-change scenario would reach €48,829 
million. In all scenarios this expenditure falls due to the elimination of the export subsidies and 
a fall in the size of the agricultural sector of the EU.  
The first more obvious saving occurs from the total phasing out of the export subsidies by the 
end of the next Financial Perspectives (2013). The model assumes that this will be one of the 
decisions adopted by the WTO in all scenarios. This creates a savings compared to the no-
change scenario of an estimated €3,945 million.  
The changes in the EU budget expenditures on direct payments and other subsidies due to the 
trade implications and the effects on production are very small thanks to the decoupling of 
direct payments from production. The drop is estimated in all cases to be less that 0.2% of direct 
payments, less than €100 million. In total, falls in all subsidies together (area premiums, output 
subsidies, subsidies on intermediaries) would not exceed €150 million.  
No assumption is made on shifting the savings to other items. These will be either deducted 
from the budget altogether or more likely used to pay for further reforms or redistributed to 
other items, such as increasing the rural development heading. This is a political decision that 
will have to be taken once the agreement is clear. 
The model assumes that the sugar policy does not hold and is dismantled as tariffs fall. Internal 
production falls, as do imports from ACP and LDCs. A particular attention is given to the sugar 
policy situation in the next section. 
Abolishing export refunds has implications, however. Export subsidies exist due to the level of 
internal price support. Not subsidising exports requires internal prices to be reduced or 
production quotas to exist or excess production to be stored or destroyed. The second option is 
clearly not on the agenda, and thus the first step is required.  
The model also does not consider the possibility that due to the trade liberalisation process, 
there might be pressure to offer further payments to the farming sectors affected, such as sugar 
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It is interesting to note that WTO negotiations are not necessarily linked to an increase in budget 
expenditures for agriculture. On the contrary, had the EU not decoupled payments, but 
undertaken to reduce export subsidies and intervention, an increase in market access would have 
not only reduced production in various sectors but also direct payment costs, as land is put out 
of production and meat and dairy production reductions affect the headage payments. While the 
single farm payment scheme might in fact lead to a greater fall in production, the sustained level 
of support will ensure that less farmers leave farming altogether. Thus the often feared land 
abandonment due to decoupling might well be less severe than under the case of no decoupling.  
Linking the eligibility of direct payments to an obligation to produce could have had important 
negative effects for farmers. Under the old system, farmers would not have been able to switch 
production or stop it in case costs exceed the returns. The combined effect of obligatory 
production costs under unfavourable conditions in addition to even lower prices could well 
cause more damage and land abandonment than decoupling, which is connected to land 
management obligations and guarantees for the continuation of correct practices on the land. If 
the terms of trade are adverse under the new reformed system, farmers can reduce production 
and land under use without losing their entitlement to direct support. 
Therefore the model predicts on the expenditure side a limited effect on the budget mainly due 
to the abolition of export subsidies. As far as other budgetary areas are concerned, no analysis 
has been performed because the WTO process does not have a direct impact on expenditures.  
4.4  Estimated impacts on Own Resources and net balances 
The impact analysis on the Own Resources and net balances originates from a budget model 
based on exogenously estimated expenditures. This model was developed to analyse impacts on 
decisions to reform policies or Own Resources. The first application of the model can be found 
at Núñez Ferrer & Emerson (2000) and has been adapted for the enlargement and the 
introduction of different alternative correction mechanisms. For this analysis the model closely 
follows the rules of the present Own Resources mechanism and has been used to calculate the 
budgetary net balances at the end of the next financial perspectives.  
At this stage no information is available on how the Commission has estimated expenditures per 
country for the recent Own Resources report (European Commission 2004a). To avoid 
differences in the estimated outcomes, the authors have estimated the expenditures in each 
country using the given net balance figures in the report, allowing the reader to compare results. 
Based on the growth rates projection used by the Commission, which the modeller requested, it 
was possible to estimate a comparable GNI for the year 2013. The modeller has assumed that 
for the base scenario the European Commission would have used recent TOR and VAT 
contributions and an estimation of the contributions of the new member states.  
The modeller has used actual TOR and VAT contributions for the year 2004 based on the 
annual budget figures (European Commission, 2004d). GNI contributions were estimated using 
the net balances before the UK rebate published in the Commission’s Own Resources Report of 
2004 and the estimated GNI of the member states. The model has then estimated the UK rebate 
which closely matches the figure by the Own Resources report and producing a resources 
estimation for 2013 based on the estimated appropriations for payments that year as in the 
financial perspectives. 
Net balance results for the year correspond very closely to those of the Own Resources report 
which indicates that the calculation of the UK rebate and the use of actual VAT and TOR 
should match closely the figures used by the Commission. These balances have also allowed an 
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then not possible to attribute it to the different headings. There is no public information on the 
estimations on expenditure on the CAP or Structural Funds in the countries for that year. 
The rapid analysis for this short study did not allow for an analysis of the distribution of the cuts 
in import tariffs by country, except for the changes in Germany and France. For other countries, 
the shares in the tariff revenue fall will be distributed based on the past distribution of the CCT 
revenues. For this exercise the agricultural levies and sugar levies have also been completely 
deducted which reduces the TOR revenues further (by approximately €300 million). 
VAT contributions are assumed to increase in proportion to GNI. This is because no change of 
the Own Resources mechanism is assumed in this analysis and because the VAT resource is 
capped. This capping has ensured that VAT contributions are for many countries similar to a 
GNI contribution.
11 Changes in consumption patterns in the member states are thus largely 
neutralised by the capping mechanism. 
Two model results are presented. The first presents the effect on net balances from a TOR 
change assuming first no change in the CAP expenditures to isolate the tariff effect. This is also 
not an unrealistic assumption, as the savings could be redirected to other CAP areas of 
intervention to compensate the losers of the liberalisation process through direct payments, such 
as the sugar producers. This would maintain the financial expenditure distribution amongst 
countries unaltered.  
If the compensation is time limited and regressive, however, it is possible that the savings would 
materialise by 2013. Thus, the second model result integrates the savings from the CAP. 
Savings from export subsidies are distributed amongst the member states according to the 
following criteria: An amount of export subsidies equivalent to the average for the period 2000-
03 is reduced from the expenditures of the EU15 based on their shares of export subsidies in 
2003 according to the financial accounts for the year by the European Commission (2004c). For 
the new member states, the remaining sum is distributed according the distribution of CAP 
expenditures as was agreed in the accession negotiations for the year 2006 (DG Agriculture, 
Fact sheet MEMO/02/301, 20 December 2002). It is assumed that €100 million will be 
distributed 30/70 between Bulgaria and Romania. Other savings are distributed in the same 
manner. The effect is minimal, as the sums are very small.  
Given the small differences in the magnitudes of the tariff effects in all simulations, only the 
case of the Harbinson1½ (simulation 2 with EBA) is presented. It shows the transmission of the 
changes to the actual contributions of the member states. 
The model does not take into account that changes in international trade can have an effect on 
the growth rates of the EU. In fact, it is assumed that trade liberalisation should benefit the EU, 
increasing economic growth in theory. 
Case 1 - Effects of the tariff reduction on budget contributions 
Annex 1 lists the effects for the member states’ contributions to the budget, with figures before 
and after the UK correction under the present rebate mechanism; the relevant figures are of 
course after those with the UK rebate. Countries that had proportionally higher contributions 
than their share in GNI contributions ‘benefit’. Denmark reduces its contribution by 4%, Estonia 
                                                      
11 “The resource based on value added tax (VAT). The VAT resource is levied on the statistical ‘notional’ 
harmonised VAT bases of member states, which is calculated on the basis of national VAT receipts. 
Furthermore, the notional VAT base is 'capped', where applicable, at 50% of each member state’s gross 
national income (GNI) to reduce the effect of the slightly ‘regressive’ character of VAT. In practice, this 
turns the VAT-based own resource into a GNI-based resource for the countries concerned by the capping 
rule. The call rate on VAT cannot exceed 0.5 % of the base.” COM(2004) 505 final. THE EU BUDGET PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION | 25 
 
by 2.9% and the Netherlands by 1.7%. Even the United Kingdom sees a reduction of 0.8 % in 
its contribution. No country suffers drastic increases due to higher GNI contributions; most are 
limited to 0.5% of their contribution. It is important to note the positive implication that the 
rebate is not affected, as TOR are excluded from rebate calculations. 
The net balances of the countries do not change through tariff effects under the official net 
balance calculation method employed by the Commission, which cancels out tariff revenue 
changes. It is also necessary to take into account that savings or increased contributions from the 
CCT should not be regarded as a benefit or a loss, as it is a resource owned by the European 
Union and should not be considered a national resource. In fact, the ‘benefits’ can also be 
considered a ‘loss’, as countries that pay less through the TOR actually benefit less from the 
25% they retain as administration costs, which is a real benefit for their exchequer. 
Case 2 - Effects of a fall in CAP expenditures on net balances 
Annex 2 presents the results of the fall in tariffs and CAP expenditures on contributions to the 
budget. As expected, member states benefit from a reduction in contributions to the budget. But 
interestingly the UK rebate increases, because even if the contributions to the budget fall, the 
net balance before the rebate deteriorates. The UK is a large exporter and the fall in export 
subsidies reduces the receipts more than it reduced contributions.  
The most interesting aspect of the analysis is the net balance effect (EU official method) 
presented in Annex 3. As is the case for the UK, the saving in the agricultural sector of course 
can damage the net balance of the main beneficiaries of the export subsidies. Denmark and 
Belgium are the largest losers and see their net balance deteriorate respectively by 0.09 and 
0.07% of GNI, followed not surprisingly by Ireland, the Netherlands and also Hungary. Ireland, 
Hungary and Lithuania see their net benefit from the budget fall by 0.06% of GNI. It is 
interesting to see that a saving in the budget for the CAP can have negative implications for 
some of the member states that are calling for a reduction in budget expenditures to reduce their 
net balances. France, while the largest loser from the CAP budget falls, also contributes a 
similar amount less to the budget, to a large extent neutralising the effect.  
It is also interesting to note that the UK rebate is a considerable burden to the budget (last 
column in Annex 3, increasing the cost of the budget. Under the present system of rebates, the 
UK would be one of the lowest net contributors amongst the wealthy member states (see figure 
of 0.29 % of GNI in net contributions compared to -0.6% for the Netherlands or -0.53% for 
Germany), while the UK is expected to be the second-wealthiest EU member state (European 
Commission, 2004a). It is true that the UK would have in fact been the main contributor in the 
absence of a rebate and there is an argument for a possible compensation, but the rebate appears 
to be excessive. This is partly due to the fact that the rebate was not conceived in such a way as 
to correct for a change in the UK’s wealth level; thus the rebate has increased with the UK’s 
improved economic performance and not only due to an increase in the contributions. 
Furthermore there is now a strongly regressive factor in the UK rebate, as the main contributors 
and thus the wealthiest countries have their contribution to the UK budget rebate reduced to a 
25% of the full amount, shifting the burden to the poorer members. 
4.5  The special case of sugar 
Sugar has long been a special case in international trade agreements. As one of the last bastions 
of the EU’s heavily protected commodity regimes, sugar is still highly subsidised within the 
EU. It is therefore widely believed that a successful EU sugar reform may prove pivotal for this 
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sugar regime, because it is one of the few agricultural sectors that can cause difficulties for the 
EU at the WTO negotiations, but also to the budget expenditures.  
The EU is a major sugar producer worldwide and was placed second in 1999 in the ranking of 
all the major producers. In that year, the EU and Brazil, the most dominant sugar producers, 
accounted with Australia, Thailand and Cuba for about 70% of world exports. The EU is unique 
in a sense, because it is a major exporter of white sugar and an importer of raw sugar in the 
world market due to its commitments to import guaranteed levels of sugar from signatories of 
the sugar protocol (mainly ACP countries), and lately LDCs. 
The dominant role of the EU in the world sugar market is the result of the high level of domestic 
support provided to its sugar sector. Through its Common Market Organisation (CMO) for 
sugar, the EU has established a minimum sugar support price, guaranteed by an intervention 
purchase system. To limit the amount of production eligible for price support, a quota system 
was introduced. The EU sugar producers (growers and processors jointly) are responsible for 
paying the costs to the EU budget of surplus quota-sugar disposal through the producer levies. 
The quota system is based on three quota types: an A quota to cover domestic consumption; a B 
quota determining the amount of sugar that could benefit for export subsidies; and finally a C 
quota which represents the excess over A and B that can be sold on the world market without 
export subsidies. 
The EU is nevertheless an excess producer of sugar. Thus, a key aspect of the policy is that an 
equivalent amount of imports from the preferential tariff rate quota could be exported with 
export subsidies without having to declare them to the WTO. Even under this condition the EU 
was having difficulties to conform with the Uruguay Round Commitments (Huan-Niemi, 
2003a). Thus, in order to stay within the final marketing year commitments of 2000-01, there 
was a ‘temporary cut’ of 498,800 tonnes in the total A and B-sugar quotas, which led to a 
decrease of subsidised sugar exports (A & B quota-sugar) while the unsubsidised sugar exports 
(C-sugar) have increased (Devadoss & Kropf, 1996). 
The situation has become complicated, with the EU now having recently lost a challenge in the 
WTO on the export subsidy commitment exception used to channel the imports from the tariff 
rate quotas of the sugar protocol signatories and ACPs, which account for over half of the EU 
subsidised exports. The appeal also included the C-quota, considered by the WTO as a cross-
subsidisation. 
This has brought the DDA negotiations on sugar out of balance, inducing the EU to reconsider 
its negotiating position in this sector. In fact, Huan-Niemi (2003a) estimated that even under the 
original EU proposals to the WTO, it would have been difficult not to breach them. 
However, the EU tabled a new proposal of its sugar regime on the 22
nd of June 2005 for 
ratification by its member states. The main features of the proposal are a 39% reduction in the 
internal sugar price with no subsequent reduction in its quotas, and restructuring aid for the 
sugar industry. It has been argued that a subsequent reduction in quotas would force the most 
competitive producers out of the market, because of their inability to expand. It appears that this 
proposal is able to bring sugar in line with its WTO obligation. However, at the time of this 
report is not possible to assess it viability, but given that the EU is losing the case to protect the 
C quota and the TQRs, the Commission viewed this proposal as workable, while other 
stakeholders received it with mixed feelings.  
The effects of such a reform would be that at face value the EU would save some money on 
export subsidies and domestic price support, although these ‘savings’ have to be distributed so 
as to compensate countries that enjoyed a special trade agreement with the EU, notably ACP 
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producers, because the guaranteed high prices received by those producers encouraged 
production without being naturally competitive in that sector.  
According to Huan-Niemi (2003b), the EU could only maintain the present system of quotas 
with a 36% tariff cut, if prices were reduced by 25% and the C-quota and sugar protocol were 
not challenged. In the absence of the latter, it is clear that a reform would need to go well 
beyond such a cut. 
Difficulties will arise even with this reform, if a WTO agreement imposes the Swiss formula of 
tariff cuts. The problem with the Swiss formula is that it will cut high tariffs more than low 
tariffs, ensuring no individual tariff exceeds 25%. Sensitive products such as sugar will be 
pressured to go through drastic reforms to protect the EU border from massive imports if this 
formula is to be implemented. The ad-valorem equivalent tariff for EU raw sugar is 169.5%. 
Thus the Swiss formula would cut the tariff by 85%, a big difference from a Harbinson option 
of a cut by 45%, which would keep the tariff around 90%. The Swiss formula would require a 
price cut of 67%, eliminating practically any price support, with a level which would correspond 
to a ‘safety net’ level (Huan-Niemi, 2003b). 
In sum, a successful and strong sugar reform is crucial for the DDA negotiations as well as for 
the CAP expenditure. The anticipated proposal by the EU Commission is expected to address all 
these issues. It also addresses the possibility that the saved funds for export subsidies might be 
channelled for capacity building in competitive sugar-producing ACP countries, as a form of 
compensation for their losses in exporting sugar to the EU under the preferential trade 
agreement. This final point was not incorporated in the budget analysis performed in section 4, 
although there is an expectation that costs of compensation and restructuring would erode part 
of the savings. 
5.  Increasing trade competition and the role of the EU budget  
As discussed earlier, the WTO process does not directly affect the budget in any large extent 
today, especially after the latest reforms for the CAP. The tariff income is a small share of the 
EU budget Own Resources, barely reaching 10% of the budgetary needs.  
The expenditure side of the EU budget is still not directly directed towards trade-related issues. 
Nevertheless, if the EU is to support its competitiveness in the trade arena, the EU budget 
should be seriously reformed with the aim to increase its effectiveness and relevance. This is 
fully in line with the Lisbon strategy, which is considered a key aspect for Europe’s trade 
performance. The budget can complement national investments in this area. The most important 
efforts, however, will still fall on national governments to perform the necessary 
macroeconomic and labour market reforms.  
The EU budget is in fact still strongly affected by political agreements reached in the past 
between the EU15, which partially used the structural and agricultural funds as a compensation 
for structural differences or net balance issues.
12 The EU should ensure that the budget is spent 
where the best impacts can be expected. It should consider revisiting the way the structural 
funds and the CAP are operating to ensure that the instruments match the needs of the EU. 
Cohesion and competitiveness are not mutually exclusive operations. 
                                                      
12 The CAP is considered a relic of an agreement between Germany and France to counterbalance the 
industrial supremacy of Germany. The cohesion fund is considered a compensation for the effects of the 
single market to Spain. The former Objective 6 regions of the structural funds were largely considered a 
method to reduce the negative net balance of Sweden and Finland (Nugent, 1999, p. 414; House of 
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The European Union is facing a growing challenge in the future by its internal (e.g. ageing) and 
external (competitiveness) challenges and its budget is not in line with the growing priorities. 
Criticisms of the lack of rationale of the present budget are well documented in the literature. 
The recently Sapir report (Sapir et al., 2005) commissioned by the European Commission has 
called for a radical change. These calls are echoed by a number of European actors in the 
testimony presented to the House of Lords (2005), members of the Group of Policy Advisors of 
the Commission (Butti & Nava, 2003) and think tanks (Gros & Micossi, 2005). 
The financial perspectives for 2007-13 have started the process of revisiting the functioning of 
the budget in line with the Lisbon strategy of the EU. It is, however, the view of many analysts 
that this process is not fast enough. The member states and the EU Commission will need to 
rethink where the best value for EU intervention lies, especially as the budget ceiling is 
increasingly restricted and needs are changing.  
The present proposals for the financial perspectives appear to deny the profound changes in the 
nature of the EU and the challenges it faces. As a result of enlargement the EU has become 
considerably poorer (on average) and has incorporated regions with a GDP per capita at 30% of 
the EU average. This calculated, using Purchasing Parity Prices (PPP), nominal incomes are 
often near to 10% of the average (Eurostat data). Despite this radical change, the EU budget 
would still concentrate more on the EU15, thanks to the intensity of the CAP aid, which is based 
on past production, but also due to a very slow adaptation of the structural funds. The financial 
perspectives still allocates an important part of the funds to the EU15, thanks to a very low 
phasing out process for regions which have seen their average GDP as percentage of the EU rise 
due to the ‘statistical effect’
13 and the fact that CAP spending still accrues mainly to the EU due 
to the way it is allocated (based on an historical production reference period).  
The lack of perspective in the budget is partially caused by the obsession with the net balances 
on the part of the member states. Any reform would affect the net balances, which are the 
outcome of difficult compromises, limiting the policy reform options drastically. This is 
reflected by the inability of the EU to accept the profound changes the enlargement has caused, 
leading to the present absurd and contradictory disputes on net balances and the future budget, 
with countries simultaneously calling to reduce budget expenditures, but defending their 
benefits from it. The EU should find a system to eliminate the net balance influence on strategic 
decisions. 
The EU needs to concentrate its resources on improving Europe’s competitiveness, as this will 
be crucial to maintain Europe’s wealth and social standards. The social welfare standards need 
the means to be sustained. 
The EU should reinforce its action in the development of human capital through the ESF and the 
investments in R&D. While the EU budget can only be a complement of the total investment in 
human resources or R&D, the long-term returns from an improvement in these areas are 
important. However, as Gros & Micossi (2005) make also clear, more funding is not enough 
without an increase in openness and competition inside the EU.  
The programming for the use of EU structural funds should also improve, creating more 
integrated programmes and induce incentives also for governments to improve their 
programming through conditionality. Only the cohesion funds have at present a conditionality 
attached to excessive public deficits, but the Commission has rarely been able to successfully 
implement it. Apart from the conditionality of EU funds, time limits for EU support could be 
introduced or an element of reinforced conditionality, which should induce the local authorities 
                                                      
13 Statistical effect: As poorer countries enter the EU, the EU average GDP per capita falls. Some regions 
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to try to invest the support wisely on sustainable growth-oriented strategies. The performance 
reserve (see European Commission, 2000) of the structural funds has already taken this role, but 
its importance is relative, as it is an additional assistance for performing a structural operation 
and not a sanction for underperformance. The n+2 rule by which funds have to be used within a 
maximum of two years from the date these have been allocated also does not challenge the 
quality of the investment but rather addresses the funds’ absorption speed. 
For agricultural policy, the objectives should be clarified and narrowed. The blanket payments 
per hectare should be phased out, especially for the larger commercial farms, while the funds 
should concentrate on saving the rural areas from decline, by developing the infrastructures and 
providing relevant training in rural areas, with a strong focus on non-agricultural employment. 
The EU should aim at developing economic potential of rural areas as far as possible and assist 
them to access and benefit from the internal market. Information technologies could play an 
important role in this respect, as these reduce the impact of the distance to the market centres. 
6. Summary  and  Conclusions 
This paper has presented an analysis of the relationship between the EU budget and the process 
of trade liberalisation, in particular the likely effects of a WTO agreement. The analysis is 
structured in three main parts: the historical influence on the EU budget; the possible direct 
implications of the Doha round; and how the budget might react to future developments, 
including how it might better address the challenges facing the European Union. 
Historically, the budget was not created to be a proactive tool in international trade. The 
linkages to trade were restricted to raising revenues for the budget or exporting excess 
production in the agricultural sector via subsidies. This is not surprising, as the budget 
expenditures were mainly limited to agricultural policy at first and only later to the structural 
funds. The first strong impact on the EU budget has arisen due to the integration of agricultural 
trade into multilateral trade negotiations following the Uruguay round. Due to the strong 
reliance of EU agricultural policy on a system of high tariffs and large export subsidies, such 
decisions have had a profound effect on the CAP, changing the policy nature and even 
objectives. 
Agriculture has dominated trade negotiations ever since. For the EU it is an important domestic 
policy and for developing countries an important development area. Hence, agriculture remains 
the area in which the WTO process has the most direct effect on the EU budget. In other areas 
the effects on the EU budget are either small or indirect. Thus the implications of the Doha 
round for the budget will still mainly occur via the effects on the CAP. Export subsidies are 
likely to be eliminated in the coming years, producing a cost saving of €4,000 million, which 
can have implications for member states’ net balances. 
On budget revenues, it is estimated that the revenues from the Common Customs Tariff will fall 
by approximately €1,000 million, which is 1% of the EU budget at present. The shortfall is then 
collected through the GNI contributions of the member states. Thus these implications are fairly 
limited. 
Tariffs do not have an effect on official net balances, as these are not taken into account for the 
purposes of net balance calculations. The savings, if not re-channelled into other expenditure 
areas in agriculture, will have implications on the net balances of the member states. It would 
damage the net balance of those countries that benefit from export subsidies, but do not register 
savings in their contributions to the EU budget of a similar magnitude. The savings, if not re-
channelled into other expenditure areas in agriculture, will have different implications on the net 
balances of member states. These would diminish the net balance of those countries that benefit 
from export subsidies but do not see a savings in their contributions to the EU budget of a 30 | KERNOHAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & SCHNEIDER 
 
similar amount. Large exporters, especially those with low contributions are the worst off. 
Hungary and the Netherlands see their net balances deteriorate by 0.06% of GNI and Denmark 
by 0.08 %. It is interesting to see that a saving in the budget for the CAP can have negative 
implications for some of the member states that are calling for a reduction in budget 
expenditures to reduce their net contributions. 
While the direct impacts of the WTO on the EU budget are limited, it is important to consider 
the role of the EU budget in the future, given the EU’s increasing domestic and international 
challenges. These arguments call for a deep revision of the budget and a speeding up of its 
restructuring in line with the Lisbon strategy and the need to promote Europe’s competitiveness. 
Even the polices aimed at cohesion have to be improved. Increased growth potential in the 
poorer EU regions may accelerate convergence, cohesion and the reduction of regional 
disparities. This requires an update of the integrated planning framework. The paper also calls 
for an improvement in the support for human capital investments from the EU budget. 
The future of the EU’s economic strength and welfare depends on its competitiveness. The EU 
budget today is a partial ‘relic’ from the outdated objectives of a different kind of EU. Now, 
with countries with much lower GDP per capita having joined the EU, an ageing population and 
increased international competitive pressures, the present budget is losing touch with reality. 
The financial perspectives for the period 2007-13, while acknowledging the challenges ahead, 
do not present a sufficiently altered agenda.  
The lack of such a perspective in the budget is partially caused by a preoccupation with the net 
balances of the member states. They are the outcome of difficult compromises that drastically 
limit policy reform options. This is reflected in the inability of the EU to accept the profound 
changes that enlargement implies, leading to the anomalous and contradictory disputes over net 
balances and future budgets, wherein countries simultaneously call for a reduction in their 
budget expenditures but also defend their benefits derived from it. The EU should try to find a 
system that eliminates this extremely unhelpful ‘net balance influence’ on such important 
strategic decisions. | 31 
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Annex 1. The Own Resources simulations – Tariff effect only, year 2014 
A. Before UK correction, base scenario and after Harbinson proposal  
Base  scenario        Harbinson  proposal 
2014 TOR  VAT  GNI  TOTAL    2014 TOR  VAT  GNI  TOTAL    change  % 
Belgium  1026.5 426.8 3074.3 4527.6    Belgium  991.0 426.8  3106.9  4524.7    -2.9 -0.06% 
Czech Republic  50.5 102.2  917.4 1070.0    Czech Republic  33.7 102.2 927.1  1063.0    -7 -0.65% 
Denmark  197 287.6 2075.6 2560.2    Denmark  62.6 287.6  2097.6  2447.8    -112.4 -4.39% 
Germany  2091.2 3614.0 22716.7 28421.8    Germany  1989.7 3614.0  22957.8  28561.4    139.6 0.49% 
Estonia  6.7 11.2 109.5 127.4    Estonia  1.5 11.2  110.7  123.4    -4 -3.14% 
Greece   132.1 337.0 2081.5 2550.6    Greece   114.6 337.0  2103.6  2555.1    4.5 0.18% 
Spain  676.9 1538.9  9418.8 11634.6    Spain  552.8 1538.9 9518.8  11610.4    -24.2 -0.21% 
France  898.3 2933.1 18278.0 22109.4    France  802.1 2933.1  18472.0  22207.2    97.8 0.44% 
Ireland  103.3 256.9 1611.0 1971.2    Ireland  78.4 256.9  1628.1  1963.4    -7.8 -0.40% 
Italy  984.2 1908.5 14334.3 17227.0    Italy  933.1 1908.5  14486.4  17328.0    101 0.59% 
Cyprus  9.5 16.9 154.1 180.5    Cyprus  8.6 16.9  155.8  181.3    0.8 0.44% 
Latvia  5.1 12.6 150.4 168.1    Latvia  4.7 12.6  152.0  169.3    1.2 0.71% 
Lithuania  17 25.1 269.6 311.8    Lithuania  15.4 25.1  272.5  313.1    1.3 0.42% 
Luxembourg  12.8 39.6 242.2 294.6    Luxembourg  12.7 39.6  244.7  297.0    2.4 0.81% 
Hungary  79 100.5  942.0 1121.5    Hungary  71.8 100.5 952.0  1124.3    2.8 0.25% 
Malta  5.4 5.6 46.6 57.6    Malta  4.9 5.6  47.1  57.6    0 0.00% 
Netherlands  1021.9 853.6 4909.0 6784.5    Netherlands  856.5 853.6  4961.1  6671.2    -113.3 -1.67% 
Austria  159.3 408.9 2516.3 3084.6    Austria  142.1 408.9  2543.0  3094.0    9.4 0.30% 
Poland  92.6 274.2 2463.2 2830.0    Poland  84.2 274.2  2489.4  2847.8    17.8 0.63% 
Portugal  93.8 264.4 1497.9 1856.1    Portugal  79.2 264.4  1513.8  1857.4    1.3 0.07% 
Slovenia  14.1 36.9 319.8 370.9    Slovenia  12.8 36.9  323.2  373.0    2.1 0.57% 
Slovakia  25.1 46.5 432.7 504.2    Slovakia  22.8 46.5  437.2  506.5    2.3 0.46% 
Finland  75.3 235.5 1659.5 1970.3    Finland  70.6 235.5  1677.1  1983.2    12.9 0.65% 
Sweden  265.4 445.1 3152.9 3863.4    Sweden  249.6 445.1  3186.3  3881.0    17.6 0.46% 
United Kingdom  2112.2 3273.4 20567.9 25953.5    United Kingdom  1745.3 3273.4  20786.2  25804.9    -148.6 -0.57% 
Bulgaria  100 20.5 304.7 425.2    Bulgaria  96.0 20.5  307.9  424.4    -0.8 -0.19% 
Romania  100 56.8 966.5  1123.3    Romania  96.0 56.8  976.8 1129.5    6.2 0.55% 
Total 10355  17532  115212  143100   Total    9132.3 17532.4  116435.3  143100.0      34 | KERNOHAN, NÚÑEZ FERRER & SCHNEIDER 
 
B. After UK correction, base scenario and after Harbinson proposal, Tariff effect only, year 2014 
Base  scenario         Harbinson proposal effect 
2014 TOR  VAT  GNI  Rebate  TOTAL      TOR  VAT  GNI  Rebate  TOTAL  change % 
Belgium  1026.5 426.8 3074.3 337.8 4865.5    Belgium  991 426.8 3106.9  337.8  4862.5   -3  -0.06% 
Czech Republic  50.5 102.2  917.4 100.8 1170.8    Czech Republic  33.7 102.2  927.1  100.8  1163.8   -7  -0.60% 
Denmark  197.0 287.6 2075.6 228.1 2788.3    Denmark  62.6 287.6 2097.6  228.1  2675.9   -112.4  -4.03% 
Germany  2091.2 3614.0 22716.7  443.6 28865.4    Germany  1989.7 3614  22957.8  443.6  29005   139.6  0.48% 
Estonia  6.7 11.2 109.5 12.0 139.4    Estonia  1.5 11.2 110.7  12  135.4   -4  -2.87% 
Greece   132.1 337.0 2081.5 228.7 2779.3    Greece   114.6 337  2103.6  228.7  2783.9   4.6  0.17% 
Spain  676.9 1538.9  9418.8 1035.1 12669.6    Spain  552.8 1538.9  9518.8  1035.1  12645.5   -24.1  -0.19% 
France  898.3 2933.1 18278.0 2008.6 24118.0    France  802.1 2933.1  18472  2008.6  24215.8   97.8  0.41% 
Ireland  103.3 256.9 1611.0 177.0 2148.3    Ireland  78.4 256.9 1628.1  177  2140.5   -7.8  -0.36% 
Italy  984.2 1908.5 14334.3 1575.2 18802.3    Italy  933.1 1908.5 14486.4  1575.2  18903.3   101  0.54% 
Cyprus  9.5 16.9 154.1 16.9 197.5    Cyprus  8.6 16.9 155.8  16.9  198.2   0.7  0.35% 
Latvia  5.1 12.6 150.4 16.5 184.7    Latvia  4.7 12.6  152  16.5  185.8   1.1  0.60% 
Lithuania  17.0 25.1 269.6 29.6 341.4    Lithuania  15.4 25.1 272.5  29.6  342.7   1.3  0.38% 
Luxembourg  12.8 39.6 242.2 26.6 321.2    Luxembourg  12.7 39.6 244.7  26.6  323.6   2.4  0.75% 
Hungary  79.0 100.5  942.0 103.5 1225.0    Hungary  71.8 100.5  952  103.5  1227.8   2.8  0.23% 
Malta  5.4 5.6 46.6 5.1 62.8    Malta  4.9 5.6 47.1  5.1  62.7   -0.1  -0.16% 
Netherlands  1021.9 853.6 4909.0  95.9 6880.4    Netherlands  856.5 853.6 4961.1  95.9 6767   -113.4  -1.65% 
Austria  159.3 408.9 2516.3  49.1 3133.7    Austria  142.1 408.9  2543  49.1  3143.1   9.4  0.30% 
Poland  92.6 274.2 2463.2 270.7 3100.7    Poland  84.2 274.2 2489.4  270.7  3118.5   17.8  0.57% 
Portugal  93.8 264.4 1497.9 164.6 2020.7    Portugal  79.2 264.4 1513.8  164.6 2022   1.3  0.06% 
Slovenia  14.1 36.9 319.8 35.1 406.0    Slovenia  12.8 36.9 323.2  35.1  408.1   2.1  0.52% 
Slovakia  25.1 46.5 432.7 47.5 551.8    Slovakia  22.8 46.5 437.2  47.5  554.1   2.3  0.42% 
Finland  75.3 235.5 1659.5 182.4 2152.7    Finland  70.6 235.5 1677.1  182.4  2165.6   12.9  0.60% 
Sweden  265.4 445.1 3152.9  61.6 3924.9    Sweden  249.6 445.1 3186.3  61.6  3942.6   17.7  0.45% 
United 
Kingdom  2112.2 3273.4 20567.9  -7392.0 18561.5    United 
Kingdom  1745.3 3273.4 20786.2  -7392  18412.9   -148.6  -0.80% 
Bulgaria  100.0 20.5 304.7 33.5 458.7    Bulgaria  96 20.5 307.9  33.5  457.9   -0.8  -0.17% 
Romania  100.0 56.8 966.5  106.2  1229.5    Romania  96 56.8 976.8  106.2  1235.8   6.3  0.51% 
Total 10355.2  17532.4  115212.4  0.0  143100    Total 9132.3  17532.4  116435.3  0  143100      THE EU BUDGET PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION | 35 
 
Annex 2. The Own Resources simulations – tariff and CAP savings effect, year 2014 
A. Before UK correction, base scenario and after Harbinson proposal  
Base  scenario        Harbinson  proposal  +  CAP  savings 
2014 TOR  VAT  GNI  TOTAL    2014 TOR  VAT  GNI  TOTAL    change  % 
Belgium  1026.5 426.8 3074.3 4527.6    Belgium  991.0 426.8  2998.8  4416.6    -111 -2.45% 
Czech Republic  50.5 102.2  917.4 1070.0    Czech Republic  33.7 102.2 894.8  1030.7    -39.3 -3.67% 
Denmark  197 287.6 2075.6 2560.2    Denmark  62.6 287.6  2024.6  2374.8    -185.4 -7.24% 
Germany  2091.2 3614.0 22716.7 28421.8    Germany  1989.7 3614.0  22158.7  27762.3    -659.5 -2.32% 
Estonia  6.7 11.2 109.5 127.4    Estonia  1.5 11.2  106.8  119.5    -7.9 -6.20% 
Greece   132.1 337.0 2081.5 2550.6    Greece   114.6 337.0  2030.4  2481.9    -68.7 -2.69% 
Spain  676.9 1538.9  9418.8 11634.6    Spain  552.8 1538.9 9187.4  11279.1    -355.5 -3.06% 
France  898.3 2933.1 18278.0 22109.4    France  802.1 2933.1  17829.0  21564.2    -545.2 -2.47% 
Ireland  103.3 256.9 1611.0 1971.2    Ireland  78.4 256.9  1571.4  1906.8    -64.4 -3.27% 
Italy  984.2 1908.5 14334.3 17227.0    Italy  933.1 1908.5  13982.2  16823.8    -403.2 -2.34% 
Cyprus  9.5 16.9 154.1 180.5    Cyprus  8.6 16.9  150.3  175.9    -4.6 -2.55% 
Latvia  5.1 12.6 150.4 168.1    Latvia  4.7 12.6  146.7  164.0    -4.1 -2.44% 
Lithuania  17 25.1 269.6 311.8    Lithuania  15.4 25.1  263.0  303.6    -8.2 -2.63% 
Luxembourg  12.8 39.6 242.2 294.6    Luxembourg  12.7 39.6  236.2  288.5    -6.1 -2.07% 
Hungary  79 100.5  942.0 1121.5    Hungary  71.8 100.5 918.8  1091.2    -30.3 -2.70% 
Malta  5.4 5.6 46.6 57.6    Malta  4.9 5.6  45.5  56.0    -1.6 -2.78% 
Netherlands  1021.9 853.6 4909.0 6784.5    Netherlands  856.5 853.6  4788.4  6498.5    -286 -4.22% 
Austria  159.3 408.9 2516.3 3084.6    Austria  142.1 408.9  2454.5  3005.5    -79.1 -2.56% 
Poland  92.6 274.2 2463.2 2830.0    Poland  84.2 274.2  2402.7  2761.1    -68.9 -2.43% 
Portugal  93.8 264.4 1497.9 1856.1    Portugal  79.2 264.4  1461.1  1804.7    -51.4 -2.77% 
Slovenia  14.1 36.9 319.8 370.9    Slovenia  12.8 36.9  312.0  361.7    -9.2 -2.48% 
Slovakia  25.1 46.5 432.7 504.2    Slovakia  22.8 46.5  422.0  491.3    -12.9 -2.56% 
Finland  75.3 235.5 1659.5 1970.3    Finland  70.6 235.5  1618.7  1924.8    -45.5 -2.31% 
Sweden  265.4 445.1 3152.9 3863.4    Sweden  249.6 445.1  3075.4  3770.1    -93.3 -2.41% 
United Kingdom  2112.2 3273.4 20567.9 25953.5    United Kingdom  1745.3 3273.4  20062.7  25081.4    -872.1 -3.36% 
Bulgaria  100 20.5 304.7 425.2    Bulgaria  96.0 20.5  297.2  413.7    -11.5 -2.70% 
Romania  100 56.8 966.5  1123.3    Romania  96.0 56.8  942.8 1095.5    -27.8 -2.47% 
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B. After UK correction, base scenario and after Harbinson proposal - tariff and CAP savings effect 
Base scenario (no WTO change)      Harbinson proposal effect 
2014 TOR  VAT  GNI  Rebate  TOTAL      TOR  VAT GNI  Rebate  TOTAL    change  % 
Belgium  1026.5 426.8 3074.3 337.8 4865.5    Belgium  991 426.8 2998.8 346.2 4762.8   -111.1  -2.28% 
Czech Republic  50.5 102.2  917.4 100.8 1170.8    Czech Republic  33.7 102.2  894.8 103.3  1134   -39.3  -3.36% 
Denmark  197 287.6 2075.6 228.1 2788.3    Denmark  62.6 287.6 2024.6 233.7 2608.5   -185.4  -6.65% 
Germany  2091.2 3614  22716.7  443.6  28865.4    Germany  1989.7 3614  22158.7  454.5  28216.8   -659.6  -2.29% 
Estonia  6.7 11.2 109.5  12 139.4    Estonia  1.5 11.2 106.8 12.3 131.8   -7.9  -5.67% 
Greece   132.1 337  2081.5  228.7  2779.3    Greece   114.6 337  2030.4  234.4  2716.3   -68.6  -2.47% 
Spain  676.9 1538.9  9418.8 1035.1 12669.6    Spain  552.8 1538.9  9187.4 1060.7 12339.8   -355.4  -2.81% 
France  898.3 2933.1  18278 2008.6  24118    France  802.1 2933.1  17829 2058.4 23622.5   -545.2  -2.26% 
Ireland  103.3 256.9  1611  177 2148.3    Ireland  78.4 256.9 1571.4 181.4 2088.2   -64.5  -3.00% 
Italy  984.2 1908.5 14334.3 1575.2 18802.3    Italy  933.1 1908.5 13982.2 1614.2  18438   -403.3  -2.14% 
Cyprus  9.5 16.9 154.1 16.9 197.5    Cyprus  8.6 16.9 150.3 17.4 193.2   -4.7  -2.38% 
Latvia  5.1 12.6 150.4 16.5 184.7    Latvia  4.7 12.6 146.7 16.9 180.9   -4.2  -2.27% 
Lithuania  17 25.1 269.6 29.6 341.4    Lithuania  15.4 25.1  263 30.4 333.9   -8.2  -2.40% 
Luxembourg  12.8 39.6 242.2 26.6 321.2    Luxembourg  12.7 39.6 236.2 27.3 315.8   -6.1  -1.90% 
Hungary  79 100.5  942 103.5  1225    Hungary  71.8 100.5  918.8 106.1 1197.2   -30.3  -2.47% 
Malta  5.4 5.6 46.6 5.1 62.8    Malta  4.9 5.6 45.5 5.2 61.2   -1.7  -2.71% 
Netherlands  1021.9 853.6  4909  95.9 6880.4    Netherlands  856.5 853.6 4788.4  98.2 6596.7   -286.1  -4.16% 
Austria  159.3 408.9 2516.3  49.1 3133.7    Austria  142.1 408.9 2454.5  50.3 3055.8   -79.1  -2.52% 
Poland  92.6 274.2 2463.2 270.7 3100.7    Poland  84.2 274.2 2402.7 277.4 3038.5   -68.9  -2.22% 
Portugal  93.8 264.4 1497.9 164.6 2020.7    Portugal  79.2 264.4 1461.1 168.7 1973.4   -51.4  -2.54% 
Slovenia  14.1 36.9 319.8 35.1  406    Slovenia  12.8 36.9  312  36 397.8   -9.1  -2.24% 
Slovakia  25.1 46.5 432.7 47.5 551.8    Slovakia  22.8 46.5  422 48.7  540   -13  -2.36% 
Finland  75.3 235.5 1659.5 182.4 2152.7    Finland  70.6 235.5 1618.7 186.9 2111.7   -45.5  -2.11% 
Sweden  265.4 445.1 3152.9  61.6 3924.9    Sweden  249.6 445.1 3075.4  63.1 3833.2   -93.2  -2.37% 
United 
Kingdom  2112.2 3273.4 20567.9  -7392 18561.5    United 
Kingdom  1745.3 3273.4 20062.7  -7575 17506.4   -872.1  -4.70% 
Bulgaria  100 20.5 304.7 33.5 458.7    Bulgaria  96 20.5 297.2 34.3  448   -11.5  -2.51% 
Romania  100 56.8 966.5  106.2  1229.5    Romania  96 56.8 942.8  108.8  1204.4   -27.7  -2.25% 
Total 10355.2  17532.4  115212.4  0  143100    Total 9132.3  17532.4  112382.3  0  139047   -4053  -2.83% | 37 
Annex 3. Impact of the CAP export refunds savings on net balances 
 
CAP expenditure 
fall due to end of 
export subsidy 
(€ million) 
Base scenario 
no rebate 
 
(1) 
Harbinson No 
rebate 
 
(2) 
Change % 
 
 
(2)-(1) 
Base scenario 
With rebate 
 
(3) 
Harbinson 
With rebate 
 
(4) 
Change 
Harbinson 
to base with rebate 
(4)-(3) 
Change to Harbinson 
non rebate 
Rebate effect 
(4)-(2) 
Belgium 413  1.51 1.42 -0.09 1.41 1.32 -0.09 -0.10 
Czech Republic 63  3.61 3.58 -0.03 3.51 3.48 -0.03 -0.10 
Denmark 253  -0.2 -0.28 -0.08 -0.3 -0.37 -0.07 -0.09 
Germany 460  -0.53 -0.51 0.02 -0.54 -0.53 0.01 -0.02 
Estonia 7  3.88 3.85 -0.03 3.78 3.75 -0.03 -0.10 
Greece   26  1.71 1.73 0.02 1.61 1.63 0.02 -0.10 
Spain 115  0.11 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.09 
France 798  -0.3 -0.31 -0.01 -0.4 -0.41 -0.01 -0.10 
Ireland 169  0.54 0.48 -0.06 0.44 0.38 -0.06 -0.10 
Italy 288  -0.3 -0.29 0.01 -0.4 -0.39 0.01 -0.10 
Cyprus 3  -0.2 -0.19 0.01 -0.3 -0.28 0.02 -0.09 
Latvia 10  4.13 4.11 -0.02 4.04 4.01 -0.03 -0.10 
Lithuania 26  4.17 4.11 -0.06 4.07 4.01 -0.06 -0.10 
Luxembourg 0  6.42 6.45 0.03 6.32 6.35 0.03 -0.10 
Hungary 98  3.64 3.58 -0.06 3.54 3.48 -0.06 -0.10 
Malta 0  1.7 1.74 0.04 1.61 1.64 0.03 -0.10 
Netherlands 521  -0.54 -0.60 -0.06 -0.56 -0.62 -0.06 -0.02 
Austria 34  -0.2 -0.18 0.02 -0.22 -0.20 0.02 -0.02 
Poland 209  3.9 3.85 -0.05 3.8 3.76 -0.04 -0.09 
Portugal 23  1.49 1.50 0.01 1.39 1.41 0.02 -0.09 
Slovenia 10  1.56 1.56 0.00 1.46 1.46 0.00 -0.10 
Slovakia 27  3.58 3.55 -0.03 3.48 3.46 -0.02 -0.09 
Finland 83  -0.17 -0.19 -0.02 -0.27 -0.28 -0.01 -0.09 
Sweden 39  -0.47 -0.45 0.02 -0.48 -0.46 0.02 -0.01 
United 
Kingdom  278 -0.63 -0.61 0.02 -0.31 -0.29 0.02 0.32 
Bulgaria 30  4.34 4.28 -0.06 4.24 4.18 -0.06 -0.10 
Romania 70  4.34 4.30 -0.40 4.24 4.21 -0.03 -0.09 | 38 
Annex 4. 
Description of the GTAP Modelling Approach 
The analyses in this paper are based on the comparative static standard multi-regional general 
equilibrium Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model. It provides an elaborate 
representation of the economy including the linkages between farming, agribusiness, industrial 
and service sectors of the economy. The use of the non-homothetic constant difference of 
elasticity (CDE) functional form to handle private household preferences, the explicit treatment 
of international trade and transport margins and a global banking sector which links global 
savings and consumption are innovative in GTAP. Trade is represented by bilateral trade 
matrices based on the Armington assumption. Further features of the standard model are perfect 
competition in all markets as well as a profit and utility maximizing behaviour of producers and 
consumers. All policy interventions are represented by price wedges. The framework of the 
standard GTAP model is well documented in the GTAP book (Hertel, 1997) and available on 
the internet (http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/). The GTAP model is implemented using the 
GEMPACK (General Equilibrium Modeling Package) Software, Version 8.0, and RunGTAP, 
Version 3.23 (Harrison & Pearson, 1996).  
Extension to the Model 
Agricultural policy instruments are represented via price wedges in the standard GTAP model. 
Therefore, the Standard GTAP model is complemented with an explicit modelling of the most 
important policy instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Due to the implementation of the WTO negotiations’ outcome, the EU trade regime, and 
consequently also the prices on the internal market, will be changed. How does this affect the 
raw milk and sugar market which are both regulated via quantitative restrictions? Whether an 
implemented quota restricts production depends on the actual price reduction caused by the 
changing trade regime. If the market prices exceed production costs, a quota rent exists, and the 
quota is binding. When the relevant price drops below production costs the quota rent 
disappears and the quota might become non-binding. Thus, a quota module would be favourable 
that allows for a binding and a non-binding quota system in dependence of the economic 
environment. Such a formulation can be integrated into the GTAP model in the form of a 
complementary approach (Bach & Pearson, 1996; Van Tongeren, 2002). This approach enables 
the model to endogenously switch between binding and non-binding states. Additionally, the 
quota rent is determined endogenously as well.  
Another important modelling issue is related to the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the EU. 
Following the approach of Frandsen, Gersfeld & Jensen (2002), we introduce an additional land 
subsidy rate into the model that is equalised across all sectors entitled to direct payments. With 
the implementation of the MTR, the existing domestic support measures are converted into a 
region-specific fully decoupled land area payment, while budgetary outlays for total domestic 
support are held constant. 
Modelling budgetary impacts 
The EU budget is introduced in the GTAP model using an innovative Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM). This SAM not only covers the expenditures and revenues of already existing agents 
(e.g. producers, government, private household, etc.), but also of the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). This EU budget receives 75% of the import duties for 
agricultural and non-agricultural products from producers, private households, the government 
and the capital account. The model is not developed to describe the impacts on the own THE EU BUDGET PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION | 39 
 
resources of the EU budget and the implications are calculated feeding the estimated % changes 
in tariff revenues to an Own Resources model presented in section 4.4, specifically designed to 
simulate the EU budget. 
Projection Module 
In addition to changes in the political environment of an economy, macroeconomic 
developments such as technological progress are of great importance for the economic growth 
of an economy. In order to take these changes into account, corresponding trends are 
incorporated into the present analysis. For this purpose an approach by Walmsley et al. (2000) is 
used that allows the inclusion of exogenous projections of the global and regional GDP and 
factor endowment into the extended GTAP model. In the simulations, technical progress is 
generated endogenously by the model, enabling the projected growth pattern. 
Data Base and Aggregation 
The simulations are based on the GTAP data base Version 5 with 1997 as base year. The data 
base consists of bilateral trade, transport and protection matrices that link 57 sectors in 76 
countries or regions. In order to keep the calculation effort within a reasonable scope, the data 
base is aggregated into 23 regions and 19 sectors. The regional sets are put together with regard 
to geographical proximity, developmental status or membership in a certain regional agreement. 
With regard to the sectoral aggregation, it was important to distinguish between primary and 
processed agricultural production sectors as well as between production commodities regulated 
via a quota and sensitive products. 
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Annex 5 
List of Abbreviations 
ACP   African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
AMS  Aggregate Measure of Support 
AVE Ad-valorem  equivalent 
CAP   Common Agricultural Policy 
CCT  Common Customs Tariff 
CMO  Common Market Organisation 
DCs Developing  Countries 
DDA  Doha Development Agenda 
EAGGF European  Agriculture  Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
EBA  Everything but Arms 
ECU  European Currency Unit 
ESF  European Structural Funds 
EU European  Union 
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GATS  General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GNI  Gross National Income 
GTAP  Global Trade Analysis Project  
LDCs  Least Developed Countries 
m Million 
MTR Mid-Term  Review 
PPP  Purchasing Power Parities 
R&D  Research and Development 
SPS  Sanitary and Phytosanitary  
STES  State Trading Enterprises  
TBT  Technical Barriers to Trade 
TOR  Traditional Own Resources 
TQR  (Preferential) Tariff Quota Rates 
TRA Trade-Related  Assistance 
TRIPs  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
VAT   Value-Added Tax 
WP World  Price 
WTO World  Trade  Organisation 
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About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
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•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
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events. 
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